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Abstract

The growing surge of misinformation among COVID-19 communication can pose
great hindrance to truth, magnify distrust in policy makers and/or degrade authorities’
credibility, and it can even harm public health. Classification of textual context on social
media data relating to COVID-19 is an effective tool to combat misinformation on social
media platforms. In this research, Twitter data was leveraged to (1) develop
classification methods to detect misinformation and identify Tweet sentiment with
respect to COVID-19 and (2) develop a human-in-the-loop interactive framework to
enable identification of keywords associated with social context, here, being
misinformation regarding COVID-19. (1) Six fusion-based classification models were
built fusing three classical machine learning algorithms. The best performing models
were selected to detect misinformation and to classify sentiment. We found the public
reacted more positively towards COVID-19 misinformation and positive sentiment
increased in August 2020 relative to April 2020 for all but political or biased related
misinformation. (2) The most semantically similar keywords were chosen via
distribution representations of topics and recommended by optimal ROC curves. The
interactive framework recommended 21 and 22 keywords related to conspiracy and
unreliable misinformation, respectively, and are most semantically similar to the user
inquiry “COVID start lab.”
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CLASSIFICATION AND KEYWORD IDENTIFICATION OF COVID-19
MISINFORMATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA: A FRAMEWORK FOR SEMANTIC
ANALYSIS

I. Introduction
1.1 General Issue
We are living in a world where information is shared at real-time speed and the
flux of information continues to grow enormously. There were 147.1 million mentions of
COVID-19 on social media at a global level in a span of one week during the early
outbreak of the pandemic going from March 16th to March 22nd, 2020 [1]. That breaks
down to 243 mentions of COVID-19 on social media at any given second throughout the
whole world during that single week. Such advanced communication technology
provides researchers with unprecedented amount of social and health information for the
benefits of scientific findings such as explaining human behaviors and health measures
[2].
However, great influxes of information come with large drawbacks. The higher
volume of social media information produces a lower signal-to-noise ratio which results
in an immense challenge identifying factual and pertinent information [3]. At his call for
a whole-of-society effort to confront health misinformation about the COVID-19
pandemic, the United States Surgeon General (U.S. SG), Dr. Vivek Murthy, recognized
that the “rapidly changing information environment has made it easier for misinformation
to spread at unprecedented speed and scale” [4]. Indeed, the World Health Organization
(WHO) anticipated the spread of information during the pandemic to be a crisis of its
1

own relatively early. On Feb 2, 2020, WHO signalized a byproduct of the pandemic is
the massive flow of information, an “infodemic” [5].
A consistent, concise, and universal definition of misinformation remains
undetermined. The definition varies from individual to individual and group to group.
One definition for misinformation offered by researchers in the field of communication is
“information considered incorrect based on the best available evidence from relevant
experts at the time” [6]. According to the United States (U.S.) Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) in its annual Homeland Threat Assessment, recognized misinformation is
a “foreign use of false or misleading information” [7]. The Department of Defense
(DoD) understood misinformation as the “unintentional dissemination of false
information” [8]. The U.S. SG’s definition of misinformation seems to combine the three
definitions above as “information that is false, inaccurate, or misleading according to the
best available evidence at the time” [4]. When misinformation is “spread intentionally to
serve a malicious purpose”, it is considered “disinformation” according to the U.S. SG
[4].
What is the big deal about disinformation and misinformation? Disinformation
and misinformation is a threat to the national security and can cause harm to public
health. The 2021 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community
recognized online disinformation as “a significant threat to the security of U.S. and allied
networks and data” [9]. DHS characterized online disinformation and misinformation
among COVID-19 as one of the foreign influence activities to weaken America both
domestically and abroad “through efforts to sow discord, distract, shape public sentiment,
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and undermine trust in Western democratic institutions and processes” [7]. One of the
examples is during the first six to seven months (2020 January to July) of the COVID-19
outbreak, malicious actors exploited misleading narratives about the origin of COVID-19,
claiming the virus was engineered as a biological weapon to achieve their geopolitical
agendas [10]. In September 2020, WHO and other international organizations published
a joint statement acknowledging that misinformation and disinformation among COVID19 can be harmful to an individual’s health both physically and mentally, misinformation
destroys lives, and disinformation polarizes public’s opinions [11]. The U.S. SG assessed
the impact of health misinformation as a serious threat to public health because it can
“cause confusion, sow mistrust, harm people’s health, and undermine public health
efforts” [4]. A joint statement by Mr. Christopher Maier, Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Mr. Neill Tipton, Director of
Defense Intelligence (Collections and Special Programs), and Mr. James Sullivan,
Defense Intelligence Agency’s Defense Intelligence Officer for Cyber, before the House
Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations, stated
that disinformation and misinformation is a critical threat to force protection as the U.S.
Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, Guardians, civilians, and their family are directly
targeted by malign actors [8]. The joint statement also recognized that disinformation
and misinformation is one of today’s greatest challenges not just to the DoD, but also to
the U.S. [8]. The negative impact of the spread of disinformation and misinformation is
undeniable. Immediate actions are required to address this ongoing issue as discussed in
the next section.

3

Combating COVID-19 disinformation and misinformation requires actions not
just from the stakeholders such as the government, news media outlets, social media
platforms, and the public, but rather from the society as a unit standing together to fight
the battle. John Hopkins Center for Health Security recently published a report calling
for a national strategy to combat threats of COVID-19 health disinformation and
misinformation. The report proposed a solution to dissolve this threat: ensuring a wholeof-nation response via multisector and multiagency collective supports from government,
academia, and private sectors [12]. The U.S. SG specified various sectors of the society
to act upon the call for a whole-of-society effort in confronting COVID-19 health
misinformation. Specifically, researchers and research institutions are called to increase
vigilance on health questions, concerns, and misinformation via different mediums of
information flow and study approaches [4].
From a defense perspective, the DoD has been supporting the following efforts to
combat disinformation and misinformation via supports from the Intelligence
Community, interagency collaboration, and partnerships [8]. For more specific on-going
efforts, the DoD and IC have been providing intelligence support to the Operations in the
Information Environment (OIE) and have been providing intelligence dissemination to
support Combatant Command Messaging. In particular, nine Combatant Commanders
signed a memorandum known as the “36-star memo” in January 2020. The
memorandum requested increased intelligence support for “messaging and countering
disinformation operations as part of great power competition.” The Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and the joint DoD-Director of National
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Intelligence responded with efforts in support of OIE. Though this line of effort of
responding to the “36-star memo” was completed recently in September 2021, many
follow-on initiatives have continued, especially efforts with focus in Open-Source
intelligence.
1.2 Problem Statement
In light of DoD’s increasing demand on Open-Source intelligence in combating
COVID-19 disinformation and misinformation, this thesis work aims to address questions
that may contribute to any on-going efforts that have been put forth by the DoD. This
work studied online social media posts from the social media platform Twitter during the
first year of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The questions of interest are as follow.
1. What is the general public’s sentiment toward COVID-19 misinformation?
2. Are there any changes in sentiment of the general public toward COVID-19
misinformation over time?
3. Is there any system available with which humans may interact regarding
specific types of COVID-19 misinformation? If not, can we build one?
4. Can we build a framework that allows humans to query a topic of interest on
COVID-19 misinformation and retrieve topic related keywords and posts?
1.3 Research Objectives
There are many types of COVID-19 misinformation with various prevalence on
social media. This thesis work adopted [13] to categorize misinformation as four types:
unreliable, conspiracy, clickbait, and political or biased. In addition, a Twitter post may
be considered having more than one type of misinformation. That is, a Tweet can be
5

labelled as both unreliable and political or biased misinformation. The general public’s
sentiment is categorized as positive sentiment or negative sentiment. Thus, a Tweet has
both contextual and sentimental characteristics. For example, one might post negative
conspiracy and political or biased misinformation while others may spread positive
political or biased misinformation on Twitter.
Most publications on social media COVID-19 misinformation detection and
diffusion stop at the foundation of classifying fake news and general discussion on
dispersion of fake news. Some offered dashboards for visualization of the fake news
propagation through time and space. However, to the best of the author’s knowledge to
date, there has not been any publication on a user oriented/interactive system that allows
users to search topic of interests relating COVID-19 misinformation on social media; this
gap is addressed in the following objectives, specifically, Objective 3. Therefore, to
answer the research questions in the previous section, the below objectives were set and
achieved in this thesis.
Objective 1: Provide knowledge discovery of general public’s sentiment toward
four types of misinformation regarding COVID-19 news during the early outbreak of the
pandemic from March 9 to April 24, 2020.
Objective 2: Detect sentiment changes regarding COVID-19 misinformation
from the early outbreak February 1 - April 29, 2020 to a summer month of July 25 August 29, 2020.
Objective 3: Construct a human-in-the-loop framework for enabling an
interactive process to ingest a human input for a topic of interest then provide both
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recommended keywords semantically similar to and accurately related to the human input
as well as related documents. Specifically, the human-in-the-loop framework digests any
dataset in a form of text through natural language processing. It then takes advantage of
a text mining algorithm for topic modeling and semantic search in order to take a user’s
topic of interest in a form of either keywords or a sentence and return keywords that are
semantically similar to the user input topic. The novel aspect of this framework is that it
then makes recommendations on the ideal number of keywords as well as identifying
such keywords along with each word’s probability of being in a target category. The
selection of the ideal set of keywords is based on the best classification performance.
That is, the ideal set of keywords scores the highest in accurately being contained in the
context of documents containing at least one of the ideal set of keywords whose
document is correctly identified for a specific targeted category. The framework ideally
should work for any dataset comprised of natural language communication; this thesis
illustrated the proof of concept and applied this framework to a COVID-19 Twitter
dataset.
This document is organized as follows: (1) Chapter II provides background on the
topics and techniques used to achieve the research objectives; (2) Objectives 1 and 2 were
achieved and documented in Chapter III which is a reprint of a conference paper [14]
presented at the 2021 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) National
Aerospace & Electronics Conference; (3) the realization of Objective 3 is shown in
Chapter IV which is a planned submission to the IEEE Transactions on Computational
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Social Systems journal; and (4) final discussion and conclusions are provided in Chapter
V.
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II. Background
2.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter covers four methods employed in the thesis as well as applications of
these methods in recent literatures related to COVID-19. In Sections 2.2 to 2.5, each
section begins with a literature review on the method and then transitions to the detail of
the method. These methods were used in various combinations to achieve the research
objectives. Specifically, Chapter III applied natural language processing (NLP), machine
learning (ML), and fusion while Chapter IV exploited NLP, ML, and distributed
representations of topics. Section 2.6 is the application of the related methods and
Section 2.7 is the summary of this chapter.
2.2 Natural Language Processing
2.2.1 Literature Review.
Computational linguistics, also known as natural language processing (NLP), is a
subfield of computer science which attempts to understand, learn, and produce one or
more human languages [15]. Natural language processing may process not only text, but
also speech, image, and video. The essential challenge in processing natural language in
all forms may contribute to the ubiquitous ambiguity found at all levels of the problem.
James Allen provided five challenging ambiguities that all natural language process as
follow [15].
•

Simple lexical ambiguity. (e.g. “duck” can be a noun referring to a bird or a
verb meaning to avoid something thrown.)
9

•

Structural or syntactic ambiguity. (e.g. in “I saw the man with a telescope,”
the telescope might be used for the viewing or might be held by the man being
observed.)

•

Semantic ambiguity. (e.g. “go” as a verb has well over 10 distinct meanings
in any dictionary.)

•

Pragmatic ambiguity. (e.g. “Can you lift that rock?” may be a yes/no question
or a request to lift the rock.)

•

Referential ambiguity. (e.g. “Jack met Sam at the station. He was feeling
ill…,” it is not clear who is ill, although the remainder of the sentence might
suggest a preferred interpretation.)

Despite the challenges, many applications to natural language processing have
made significant improvements over the past two decades, especially in machine
translation, machine reading, spoken dialogue systems and conversational agents, social
media mining, and analysis and generation of speak state [16]. Other applications to
natural language processing includes, but is not limited to the following according to
Towards Data Science [17].
•

Retrieval. (Google finds relevant and similar results.)

•

Information extraction. (Gmail structures events from emails.)

•

Machine translation. (Google Translate translates language from one language
to another.)

•

Text simplification. (Rewordify simplifies the meaning of sentences.)

•

Sentiment analysis. (Hater News gives us the sentiment of the user.)

•

Text summarization. (Smmry gives a summary of sentences.)
10

•

Spam filter. (Gmail filters spam emails separately.)

•

Automatic prediction. (Google Search predicts user search results.)

•

Automatic correction. (Google Keyboard and Grammarly correct words
otherwise spelled wrong.)

•

Speech recognition. (Google WebSpeech or Vocalware.)

•

Question answering.

•

Natural language generation. (Generation of text from image or video.)

In this work, social media data mining, text preprocessing, context analysis
including sentimental context and textual context, and semantic search were direct
beneficiaries of natural language processing.
2.2.2 Baseline Text Preprocessing.
Baseline text-preprocessing applied in this thesis work used regular expression to
remove and replace certain words or characters yet preserved semantically meaningful
information. The baseline text-preprocessing includes removing non-alphabetic
characters and non-informative words; replacing emojis and smileys with the word
“happy or “sad” accordingly; replacing contractions such as “didn’t” with its long form
“did not”; case folding which converts all words to lower cases; removing non-alphabetic
words such as numbers and symbols; removing non-ASCII characters, mentions, urls,
retweet “RT”, and single letters; replacing punctuations with a space; replacing three or
more identical consecutive letters with two letters.

11

2.2.3 Normalization.
Various normalization methods can be applied after the baseline textpreprocessing step. In particular, tokenization, stop words removal, and lemmatization
are often seen as normalization methods. Tokenization is a process to break down a
string of text into a smaller unit such as words, and the words are called tokens. Text in
the English language is separated by a white space, therefore, it is a common practice to
tokenize English text by a white space. However, separating text by a white space may
incur issues when inferring meaning, for instance, separating the pharse “rock n roll” into
three individual tokens “rock”, “n”, “roll”.
Stop words are a set of commonly used words that carry little semantic
information. This research made use of the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) [18] Stop
Words list which contains 179 stop words. Stop words in this list include words such as
pronouns “I”, “them”; prepositional words such as “from”, “on”; contractions words such
as “couldn’”, counldn’t”. Notice there is no letter t for the contraction example
“couldn’”.
Lemmatization is a text process with reduces words to their stems, i.e., removes
affixes of words to obtain their root form. There are two types of lemmatizations applied
in this research. Frist, Porter Stemmer is a tool for removing the more common
morphological and inflexional endings from words in English [19]. Porter Stemmer uses
its own rules for deciding how to remove affixes. For example, the word “lying” is a
variation of the word “lie”. However, a limitation of this method includes instances in
which some resulting tokens might not appear as English words. For example, the
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process might reduce the word “diabetes” to “diabet” where “es” is removed since “es”
could be suffix of a plural form. Second, WordNet Lemmatizer is a tool for removing
affixes only if the resulting word is contained in the WordNet dictionary [20]. WordNet
lemmatizer convers the word “women” to “woman” while it does not alter the word
“lying” as in Porter Stemmer.
2.3 Machine Learning
2.3.1 Literature Review.
Naïve Bayes, logistic regression, and support vector classifier algorithms are
supervised classical machine learning algorithms that predict an output of a class based
on inputs and the corresponding ground truth labels. All three of these machine learning
classifiers employed in this research are linear classifiers producing the estimated class
based on a linear combination of the features. Naïve Bayes is a generative model while
both logistic regression and support vector classifier are discriminative models.
Generative or discriminative depends on the process of obtaining the output, i.e.,
predicting a class to which a document belongs. The prediction of a class depends on the
conditional probability 𝑃(𝑐|𝑑) where 𝑐 is a class and 𝑑 is a document. Naïve Bayes is a
generative model as it does not compute the probability directly, rather, it computes the
probabilities of a prior and a likelihood. A generative model such as naïve Bayes takes
advantage of the likelihood such that features of a document can be generated under the
condition of knowing what class to which each feature belongs in the document. A
discriminative model attempts to compute the conditional probability 𝑃(𝑐|𝑑) directly in
hope of learning to assign a high weight to document features such that its ability to
13

discriminate between classes can be improved. The description of the naïve Bayes [21]
and logistic regression [22] models in the sections below are based on the third edition of
a working book, Speech and Language Processing, by Daniel Jurafsky and James Martin
[23]. The description of a support vector classifier is based on the book “An Introduction
to Statistical Learning with Applications in R” by Gareth et al. [24].
2.3.2 Naïve Bayes.
As applied to the data used in this research, the naïve Bayes algorithm contains a
probabilistic classifier technique selecting a class with the highest computed posterior
probability for a given Tweet by applying Bayes’ rule with the bag of words assumption
and conditional independence assumption. First, a probabilistic classifier means that for
a Tweet 𝑡, out of all classes 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶, the classifier returns the class 𝑐 that has the maximum
posterior probability conditioning on the Tweet 𝑡. Therefore, naïve Bayes is estimating 𝑐
by
𝑐 ≈ 𝑐̂ = max 𝑃(𝑐|𝑡).

(1)

𝑐∈𝐶

By Bayes rule,
𝑃(𝑦|𝑥) =

𝑃(𝑥|𝑦)𝑃(𝑦)
𝑃(𝑥)

,

(2)

and 𝑐̂ becomes
𝑐 ≈ 𝑐̂ = max 𝑃 (𝑐|𝑡) = max
𝑐∈𝐶

𝑐∈𝐶

𝑃(𝑡|𝑐)𝑃(𝑐)
𝑃(𝑡)

.

(3)

Since the probability of a Tweet, 𝑃(𝑡), is a constant for each class, 𝑃(𝑡) is set to 1 and is
therefore dropped from Equation (3) which becomes
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𝑐 ≈ 𝑐̂ = max 𝑃 (𝑐|𝑡) = max 𝑃(𝑡|𝑐)𝑃(𝑐).
𝑐∈𝐶

𝑐∈𝐶

(4)

In short, naïve Bayes is selecting the highest posterior probability, 𝑃(𝑐|𝑡), by selecting
the highest product of two probabilities: the likelihood of the Tweet occurring for class c,
𝑃(𝑡|𝑐), and the prior probability of the class c, 𝑃(𝑐).
Without loss of generality, suppose a Tweet is represented as a set of words or
features 𝑤1 , 𝑤2 , 𝑤3 , … , 𝑤𝑛 such that Equation (4) becomes
𝑐 ≈ 𝑐̂ = max 𝑃(𝑤1 , 𝑤2 , 𝑤3 , … , 𝑤𝑛 |𝑐)𝑃(𝑐).
𝑐∈𝐶

(5)

Then estimating 𝑃(𝑤1 , 𝑤2 , 𝑤3 , … , 𝑤𝑛 |𝑐) requires two assumptions: (1) the bag of words
assumption, that is, the order or the position of the words do not matter in a Tweet; (2)
the naïve Bayes assumption which is the conditional independence assumption given in
Equation (6) for generic events 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝐶 in which 𝐴 and 𝐵 are expressed as
conditionally independent of event 𝐶:
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵|𝐶 ) = 𝑃 (𝐴|𝐶 )𝑃(𝐵|𝐶).

(6)

Assuming conditional independence, then Equation (5) becomes
𝑐 ≈ 𝑐̂ = max 𝑃(𝑐)𝑃(𝑤1 |𝑐)𝑃(𝑤2 |𝑐), … , 𝑃(𝑤𝑛 |𝑐).
𝑐∈𝐶

(7)

Therefore, the equation for the probability associated with a particular class using the
naïve Bayes classifier can be written as 𝑐𝑁𝐵 where
𝑐𝑁𝐵 = max 𝑃(𝑐) ∏𝑤∈𝑊 𝑃(𝑤|𝑐).
𝑐∈𝐶

(8)

Indexing each word in the training set 𝑊 and defining 𝐼 as the set of indexes in Equation
(8) yields
𝑐𝑁𝐵 = max 𝑃(𝑐) ∏𝑖∈𝐼 𝑃(𝑤𝑖 |𝑐).
𝑐∈𝐶
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(9)

Equation (9) could cause a computational issue called overflow or underflow if there are
tens of thousands of features in a language model which is very common in practice.
Overflow or underflow occur when a number exceeds the value range for a data type that
a standard computer can store or represent. To avoid this computational issue, the
logarithm is applied as follows
𝑐𝑁𝐵 = max log𝑃(𝑐 ) + ∑𝑖∈𝐼 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃(𝑤𝑖 |𝑐).
𝑐∈𝐶

(10)

To calculate the probability of a class 𝑃(𝑐 ), first let 𝑇𝑐 be the number of Tweets in class 𝑐
and let 𝑁𝑡 be the total number of Tweets. Then 𝑃(𝑐 ) is the percentage of Tweets in
training dataset 𝑊 that are in each class 𝑐 and estimated as
𝑇

𝑃(𝑐 ) ≈ 𝑃̂(𝑐) = 𝑁𝑐 .

(11)

𝑡

There are multiple ways to calculate 𝑃(𝑤𝑖 |𝑐), here, a specific algorithm was used
as a convention. Specifically, the multinomial naïve Bayes algorithm [25] from Scikitlearn [26] was employed as a classifying algorithm. Furthermore, the predict_proba
method from the MultinomialNB module was selected in calculating 𝑃(𝑤𝑖 |𝑐) which is
formulated as in Equation (12).
𝑁 +𝛼

∑

𝑃(𝑤𝑖 |𝑐) = 𝑁 𝑐𝑖+𝑛𝛼 = ∑𝑛𝑤∈𝑊𝑁
𝑐

𝑖=1

𝑤𝑖 +𝛼

𝑐𝑖 +𝑛𝛼

,

(12)

where 𝑤𝑖 is the 𝑖th feature/word, 𝑐𝑖 is the 𝑖th class, 𝑛 is the number of features/words, 𝑊
is the training dataset, 𝑁𝑐𝑖 = ∑𝑤∈𝑊 𝑤𝑖 is the number of times the 𝑖th feature/word appears
in class 𝑐 in the training dataset 𝑊, 𝑁𝑐 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑁𝑐𝑖 is the total number of times each
feature/word appear in class 𝑐 in the training dataset 𝑊, that is, 𝑁𝑐 is the word count in
class 𝑐, 𝛼 is a smoothing prior accounting for features not present in the training sample
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to prevent zero probabilities in calculation. Note that this smoothing prior has a default
value of 𝛼 = 1 which is called Laplace smoothing.
2.3.3 Logistic Regression.
Logistic regression is a discriminative classifier that computes the probability of
assigning a class 𝑐 to a Tweet 𝑡, 𝑃(𝑐|𝑡). Compared with the naïve Bayes algorithm, the
most distinct difference is that naïve Bayes is a generative classifier where Tweets are
generated by words which are generated by sampling from the conditional probability
𝑃(𝑡|𝑐). The naïve Bayes classifier estimates 𝑃(𝑐|𝑡) by estimating the product of a
likelihood probability and a prior probability without computing the conditional
probability 𝑃(𝑐|𝑡) directly. In contrast, logistic regression is a discriminative model
which aims to learn the appropriate class by putting more weights on the words such that
the model is able to discriminate between classes despite the fact that the model was not
able to generate an example of one of the classes.
Both naïve Bayes classifier and logistic regression classifier are probabilistic
classifiers that employ supervised machine learning. There are four components for such
a probabilistic machine learning classifier: (1) an input represented by a feature; (2) an
output determined by a classification function; (3) an objective function for learning; and
(4) an algorithm for optimizing the objective function. A brief summary of these four
components specific to logistic regression follows.
(1) An input represented by a feature. Any supervised machine learning
classifier requires 𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝑚 pairs of input/ output in the training corpus, (𝑥 (𝑖) , 𝑦 (𝑖) ).
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A vector representing features for each 𝑥 (𝑖) can be written as [𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑛 ], and the 𝑖th
feature is denoted by 𝑥𝑖 .
(2) An output determined by a classification function. For logistic regression,
sigmoid and softmax are the classification functions for binary classes and multi-classes,
respectively. For the binary case with two class outcomes, 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 , the classification
function makes a prediction based on probabilities of an observation 𝑥 assigned to all
possible classes 𝑦, 𝑃(𝑦|𝑥), where 𝑦 ∈ {𝑦1 , 𝑦2 }. The logistic regression learns a vector of
weights and bias from a training dataset to indicate the importance of each feature. Each
weight 𝑤𝑖 is a real number signifying the importance of an input feature 𝑥𝑖 to the
classification function that determines the output label for a specific class as 𝑦̂ = 𝑦1 or
𝑦̂ = 𝑦2 . Bias is known as the intercept. The bias 𝑏 is a real value that adds to the
weighted input. The weighted sum combining weights and the bias is governed by the
linear function 𝑧 as shown in Equation (13).
𝑧 = (∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 𝑥𝑖 ) + 𝑏.

(13)

The sum product of weight 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖 , ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 𝑥𝑖 , can be represented as 𝑤
⃗⃗ ∙ 𝑥 where 𝑤
⃗⃗ =
[𝑤1 , 𝑤2 , … , 𝑤𝑛 ] and 𝑥 = [𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑛 ], then 𝑧 becomes
𝑧=𝑤
⃗⃗ ∙ 𝑥 + 𝑏.

(14)

The sigmoid function maps the value of the weighted sum 𝑧 to an interval [0,1],
representing a candidate probability estimate for a specific class. The sigmoid is also
known as the logistic function denoted as 𝜎(𝑧) and shown as
1

1

𝜎(𝑧) = 1+𝑒 −𝑧 = 1+exp(−𝑧).
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(15)

𝜎(𝑧) returns a value between 0 and 1. To ensure 𝜎 (𝑧) is a probability, we make the
probabilities of an observation assigned to all possible classes sums to 1, i.e.,
𝑃(𝑦 = 𝑦1 |𝑥 ) + 𝑃(𝑦 = 𝑦2 |𝑥 ) = 1. Then, the probability of an observation being in class
𝑦1 and class 𝑦2 are shown in Equation (16) and Equation (17), respectively. Note that
Equation (16) and Equation (17) are the probabilities for a function on 𝑦 that labels 𝑦 as
outcome class 𝑦1 and class 𝑦2 , respectively.
𝑃(𝑦 = 𝑦1 ) = 𝜎(𝑧)
= 𝜎 (𝑤
⃗⃗ ∙ 𝑥 + 𝑏)
1

= 1+𝑒 −(𝑤
⃗⃗⃗ ∙𝑥
⃗⃗ +𝑏)

(16)

1

= 1+exp(−(𝑤
.
⃗⃗ ∙𝑥 +𝑏))
And applying the sigmoid function property 1 − 𝜎(𝑥 ) = 𝜎(−𝑥 ), we have
𝑃(𝑦 = 𝑦2 ) = 1 − 𝑃(𝑦 = 𝑦1 )
= 1 − 𝜎 (𝑧 )
1

= 1 − 1+exp(−(𝑤
⃗⃗ ∙𝑥 +𝑏))

(17)

exp(−(𝑤
⃗⃗ ∙𝑥 +𝑏))

= 1+exp(−(𝑤
⃗⃗ ∙𝑥 +𝑏))
= 𝜎(−(𝑤
⃗⃗ ∙ 𝑥 + 𝑏)).
A decision boundary is an arbitrary value between 0 and 1 to guide the classification
function in predicting the estimated class 𝑦̂. In particular, suppose the decision boundary
is 0.5, the classification function assigns the estimated class 𝑦̂ to 𝑦1 if the probability of
an observation in 𝑦1 class is greater than 0.5. Thus, we have
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𝑦1
𝑦̂ = {𝑦
2

𝑖f 𝑃 (𝑦 = 𝑦1 |𝑥) > 0.5
otherwise.

(18)

(3) An objective function for learning. A common objective function for learning
weights in a machine learning approach for logistic regression is the cross-entropy loss
function. Generally, a loss function measures the difference between the classifier output
𝑦̂ and the ground truth output 𝑦 and is denoted as 𝐿(𝑦̂, 𝑦). The cross-entropy loss
function is the negative log likelihood loss where the log probability of the true 𝑦 labels
in the training dataset is maximized, known as the conditional maximum likelihood
estimation. Therefore, the goal is to maximize the probability of the true class label
𝑃(𝑦|𝑥) and is shown as
Maximize: log(𝑃(𝑦|𝑥)) = log(𝑦̂ 𝑦 (1 − 𝑦̂)1−𝑦 )
(19)
= 𝑦 log(𝑦̂) + (1 − 𝑦)log (1 − 𝑦̂).
Then flipping the sign to turn the probability into a loss to be minimized as the following
Minimize: 𝐿𝐶𝐸 (𝑦̂, 𝑦) = − log(𝑃(𝑦|𝑥))
= −(𝑦 log(𝑦̂) + (1 − 𝑦) log(1 − 𝑦̂))

(20)

= −(𝑦 log(𝜎(𝑤
⃗⃗ ∙ 𝑥 + 𝑏)) + (1 − 𝑦) log(1 − 𝜎(𝑤
⃗⃗ ∙ 𝑥 + 𝑏))).
(4) An algorithm for optimizing the objective function. The last step is to
minimize the cross-entropy loss function via stochastic gradient descent to identify the
optimal weights and bias. Let 𝜃 denote the set of parameters in the loss function, then,
𝜃 = {𝑤, 𝑏} is the parameterized parameter for the logistic regression cross-entropy loss
function. The goal is to find the average of the minimized loss function identified by the
set of weights, 𝜃̂ .
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1
𝑖
𝑖
𝜃̂ = min 𝑚 ∑𝑚
𝑖=1 𝐿𝐶𝐸 (𝑓(𝑥 ; 𝜃), 𝑦 ).
𝜃

(21)

Since the logistic regression loss function is a convex function, the global
minimum can be identified by the gradient descent of the loss function. That is, to find
the gradient of the loss function at the current position then move in the opposite
direction. The magnitude of the amount of move in gradient descent is the slope of
𝑑
𝑑𝑤

𝑓(𝑥; 𝑤) weighted by a learning rate 𝜂. In each dimension 𝑤𝑖 , the slope
𝜕

∇𝜃 𝐿(𝑓(𝑥; 𝜃), 𝑦) is the partial derivative 𝜕𝑤 of the loss function 𝐿(𝑓(𝑥; 𝜃), 𝑦). Finally, to
𝑖

update 𝜃 based on the gradient is
𝜃𝑡+1 = 𝜃𝑡 − 𝜂∇𝐿(𝑓(𝑥; 𝜃), 𝑦).

(22)

Therefore, the derivative of the cross-entropy loss function becomes
𝜕𝐿𝐶𝐸 (𝑦̂,𝑦)
𝜕𝑤𝑗

= (𝜎(𝑤
⃗⃗ ∙ 𝑥 + 𝑏) − 𝑦)𝑥𝑗 .

(23)

For this work, the Logistic Regression algorithm [27] from Scikit-learn [26] was
employed to perform the classification task.
2.3.4 Support Vector Classifier.
The support vector classifier is another discriminative model where the output of
the estimated class is determined by the position of a test observation relative to a
specific hyperplane meant to discriminate between the classes of interest. A hyperplane
in a linear space is a co-dimensional one linear space that can be translated. A 𝑝dimentional hyperplane can be defined as
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑋1 + 𝛽2 𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 𝑋𝑝 = 0.
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(24)

If a point 𝑋 = (𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , … , 𝑋𝑝 )𝑇 in 𝑝-dimensional space satisfies Equation (24) then 𝑋 lies
on the hyperplane. If a point does not satisfy Equation (24), instead,
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑋1 + 𝛽2 𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 𝑋𝑝 > 0,

(25)

then the point lies above the hyperplane. If the lefthand side of Equation (24) is less than
zero, then a point lies below the hyperplane. Training a classifier that is solely based on a
separating hyperplane requires perfectly separable training observations which in practice
rarely occurs. Therefore, a room for error around the hyperplane is more practical. That
is, creating a bandwidth or margin around the hyperplane to allow a few
misclassifications of observations during the training of the classifier is a viable solution
to issues risen by a perfectly separating hyperplane.
The support vector classifier, also known as the soft margin classifier, allows
some training observations to be on the incorrect side of the margin, or even on the
incorrect side of the hyperplane during the training phase. The margin is soft since it
allows a few violations of training observations to be on the incorrect side of the
hyperplane. As an illustration, Figure 1 presents a support vector classifier trained using
a small dataset. The black solid line is the hyperplane, and the two dashed lines are
margins. Majority of the observations fall on the correct sides of the margins and only a
few observations are on the wrong sides of the margin. Yellow observations 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
are on the correct side of the margin, observation 2 is on the margin, observation 1 is on
the wrong side of the margin, and the worst is when observation 8 is on the wrong side of
the hyperplane. Teal observations 4, 6, 7, 8 are on the right side of the margin,
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observations 3, 5 are on the margin, observation 2 is on the wrong side of the margin
while observation 1 is on the wrong side of the hyperplane.

Figure 1. A Support Vector Classifier Fit to a Small Training Dataset Shown on a
Two-Dimensional Space

To summarize, a support vector classifier classifies a test observation by the side
of the hyperplane on which it falls. The hyperplane is trained to separate the training
observations as much as possible while allowing room for a few misclassifications. To
train a support vector classifier is a maximization task summarized as
max

𝑀

(26)

subject to ∑ 𝛽𝑗2 = 1

(27)

𝛽0 ,𝛽1 ,𝛽2 ,…,𝛽𝑝 ,𝜖1 ,𝜖2 ,…,𝜖𝑝 ,𝑀
𝑝

𝑗=1

𝑦𝑖 (𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖1 + 𝛽2 𝑥𝑖2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑖𝑝 ) ≥ 𝑀(1 − 𝜖𝑖 )

(28)

𝑛

𝜖𝑖 ≥ 0, ∑ 𝜖𝑖 ≤ 𝐶
𝑖=1
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(29)

where 𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , … , 𝑥𝑛 ∈ ℝ𝑝 are 𝑛 training observations and 𝑦1 , 𝑦2 , … , 𝑦𝑛 ∈ {−1,1} are the
ground truth labels associated with the training observations. Labels of −1 and 1 are two
classes each observation to which can be assigned. 𝑀 is the width of the margin,
𝜖1 , 𝜖2 , … , 𝜖𝑝 are slack variables with non-negative real values that allow each individual
observations to be on the wrong side of the margin or the hyperplane, and 𝐶 is a nonnegative tunable hyperparameter determines the amount of tolerances for violation to the
margin. Finally, the side of the hyperplane on which a test observation 𝑥′ falls is
determined by the sign of 𝑓(𝑥 ′ )
𝑓 (𝑥 ′ ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥′1 + 𝛽2 𝑥′2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 𝑥′𝑝 .

(30)

One interesting property of support vector classifiers is that only the observations
lie on the margin or that violate to the margin affect the hyperplane. All other
observations being on the correct side of the margin do not play a role in shaping the
margin. This is where the name support vectors come from, the observations that affect
the hyperplane are the support vectors since they affect the support vector classifier.
Therefore, depending on the tunable hyperparameter 𝐶, the number of support vectors
may incur bias-variance trade-off of the support vector classifier. For a small value of 𝐶,
the width of the margin 𝑀 will be small, and the number of support vectors that lie
directly on the margin or on the wrong side of the margin will be small, therefore only a
few numbers of training observations, here being the support vectors, are used to
determine the hyperplane. This scenario leads to a classifier with high variance but low
bias and highly fit to training data. Large 𝐶 value results in large 𝑀, large number of
support vectors, and a classifier that is less fit to training data with large bias and small
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variance. For this work, Linear Support Vector Classifier (LinearSVC) [28] from Scikitlearn [26] was employed to perform the classification task.
2.4 Fusion
2.4.1 Literature Review.
The concept of data fusion is hardly anything new. In 1997, Hall and Llinas
provided a well-known definition of data fusion: “[d]ata fusion techniques combine data
from multiple sensors, and related information from associated databases, to achieve
improved accuracies and more specific inferences than could be achieved by the use of a
single sensor alone” [29]. Multiple literature have shown the overall accuracy or
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves of fusion outcome performs better than
that of an individual source [30], [31], [32]. There are numerous ways to combine
multiple individual sources. Depending on the methods chosen for such a combination
task, some fused outcomes may lead to a better performance than that of a single source
while some lead to worse ones [33]. In this work, we considered fusing the outcomes of
three machine learning classifiers using four types of fusion rules, namely, two Boolean
based-fusion rules: the logical AND rule and the logical OR rule, majority vote fusion
rule, and sensor dominance fusion rule. A brief summary of each rule follows.
2.4.2 Logical AND Fusion Rule.
Suppose there is a label set 𝑆 = {𝑚, 𝑛} where 𝑚, 𝑛 have categorical labels such
that 𝑚 represents “misinformation” and 𝑛 represents “non-misinformation”. The logical

25

AND rule applies a binary operation denoted by ∧ on 𝑆 and its results can be found in the
AND truth table shown in Figure 2.

𝐵𝜙 (𝑒)

AND

𝐴𝜃(𝑒)

∧

𝑚

𝑛

𝑚

𝑚

𝑛

𝑛

𝑛

𝑛

Figure 2. The Boolean AND Rule Truth Table
𝐴𝑁𝐷
Therefore, the new classifier 𝑅𝜃,𝜙
is defined by the point-wise logical AND rule on

each element output, that is,
𝐴𝑁𝐷 ( )
𝑅𝜃,𝜙
𝑒 = 𝐴𝜃 (𝑒) ∧ 𝐵𝜙 (𝑒) for all 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸,

(31)

where 𝐴, 𝐵 are two individual classifiers whose parameters are 𝜃 and 𝜙, respectively; 𝑒 is
an event outcome and 𝐸 is a set of all event outcomes. When the full range of classifier
parameters are considered, then a new classifier family ℛ 𝐴𝑁𝐷 is generated as
𝐴𝑁𝐷
ℛ 𝐴𝑁𝐷 = {𝑅𝜃,𝜙
: 𝜃 ∈ Θ, 𝜙 ∈ Φ}.

(32)

𝐴𝑁𝐷 ( )
Therefore, the new classifier produced under the logical AND rule, 𝑅𝜃,𝜙
𝑒 , labels an

event 𝑒 as misinformation 𝑚 when both classifiers 𝐴𝜃 (𝑒) and 𝐵𝜙 (𝑒) label the event 𝑒 as
𝐴𝑁𝐷 ( )
a misinformation 𝑚. That is, 𝑅𝜃,𝜙
𝑒 = 𝑚 only when 𝐴𝜃 (𝑒) = 𝑚 and 𝐵𝜙 (𝑒) = 𝑚. If

either 𝐴𝜃 (𝑒) or 𝐵𝜙 (𝑒) or both 𝐴𝜃 (𝑒) and 𝐵𝜙 (𝑒) labels an event as non-misinformation 𝑛,
𝐴𝑁𝐷 ( )
then the fused classifier 𝑅𝜃,𝜙
𝑒 will label the event as non-misinformation.
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In a situation where three individual classifiers were used, the binary operation ∧ on three
sets can be reduced to operation on two set by set commutative and associative properties
as follows. Suppose three classifiers are 𝑋𝛼 (𝑒), 𝑌𝛽 (𝑒), and 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒), then the results of
ANDing three classifiers is congruent to that of ANDing two classifiers as shown below.
𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) ∧ 𝑌𝛽 (𝑒) ∧ 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒)
= (𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) ∧ 𝑌𝛽 (𝑒)) ∧ 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒)
(33)
= 𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) ∧ (𝑌𝛽 (𝑒) ∧ 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒))
≅ 𝐴𝜃 (𝑒) ∧ 𝐵𝜙 (𝑒).
2.4.3 Logical OR Fusion Rule.
Using the same set notation as for the logical AND fusion rule, the logical OR
rule applies a binary operation denoted by ∨ on 𝑆 and its results can be found in the OR
truth table as shown in Figure 3.

𝐵𝜙 (𝑒)

OR

𝐴 𝜃 (𝑒 )

∨

𝑚

𝑛

𝑚

𝑚

𝑚

𝑛

𝑚

𝑛

Figure 3. The Boolean OR Rule Truth Table
𝑂𝑅
Therefore, the new classifier 𝑅𝜃,𝜙
is defined by the point-wise logical OR rule on each

element output, that is,
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𝑂𝑅 ( )
𝑅𝜃,𝜙
𝑒 = 𝐴𝜃 (𝑒) ∨ 𝐵𝜙 (𝑒) for all 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸.

(34)

A new classifier family ℛ 𝑂𝑅 is generated as
𝑂𝑅
ℛ 𝑂𝑅 = {𝑅𝜃,𝜙
: 𝜃 ∈ Θ, 𝜙 ∈ Φ}.

(35)

𝑂𝑅 ( )
Therefore, the new classifier produced under the logical OR rule, 𝑅𝜃,𝜙
𝑒 , labels an event

𝑒 as misinformation 𝑚 when either classifier 𝐴𝜃 (𝑒) or 𝐵𝜙 (𝑒) or both label the event 𝑒 as
𝑂𝑅 ( )
a misinformation 𝑚. That is, 𝑅𝜃,𝜙
𝑒 = 𝑚 when 𝐴𝜃 (𝑒) = 𝑚 or 𝐵𝜙 (𝑒) = 𝑚 or both

𝐴𝜃 (𝑒) = 𝑚 and 𝐵𝜙 (𝑒) = 𝑚. If both 𝐴𝜃 (𝑒) and 𝐵𝜙 (𝑒) label an event as non𝑂𝑅 ( )
misinformation 𝑛, then the fused classifier 𝑅𝜃,𝜙
𝑒 will be labeled as non-

misinformation.
Similarly, in a situation where three individual classifiers were used, the binary operation
∨ on three sets can be reduced to operation on two set by set commutative and associative
properties as follows. Suppose three classifiers are 𝑋𝛼 (𝑒), 𝑌𝛽 (𝑒), and 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒), then the
results of ORing three classifiers is congruent to that of ORing two classifiers as shown
below.
𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) ∨ 𝑌𝛽 (𝑒) ∨ 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒)
= (𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) ∨ 𝑌𝛽 (𝑒)) ∨ 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒)
(36)
= 𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) ∨ (𝑌𝛽 (𝑒) ∨ 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒))
≅ 𝐴𝜃 (𝑒) ∨ 𝐵𝜙 (𝑒).
2.4.4 Majority Vote Fusion Rule.
Building upon the logical AND and OR fusion rules, then for the three classifiers
𝑋𝛼 (𝑒), 𝑌𝛽 (𝑒), and 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒), the majority vote fusion rule applies binary operations ∨ and ∧
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on 𝑆 such ∨ is applied after applying ∧ to each distinct pair sets. Then the new classifier
𝑀𝑉 ( )
𝑅Α,Β,Γ
𝑒 for three classifiers becomes
𝑀𝑉 ( )
𝑅Α,Β,Γ
𝑒 = (𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) ∧ 𝑌𝛽 (𝑒)) ∨ (𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) ∧ 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒)) ∨ (𝑌𝛽 (𝑒) ∧ 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒)) .

(37)
for all 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸.
A new classifier family ℛ 𝑀𝑉 under majority vote is generated as
𝑀𝑉
ℛ 𝑀𝑉 = {𝑅Α,Β,Γ
: 𝛼 ∈ Α, 𝛽 ∈ Β, γ ∈ Γ} .

(38)

𝑀𝑉 ( )
Therefore, the new classifier produced under the majority vote rule, 𝑅Α,Β,Γ
𝑒 , labels an

event 𝑒 as misinformation 𝑚 when majority of classifiers agree on an event outcome.
𝑀𝑉 ( )
That is, 𝑅Α,Β,Γ
𝑒 = 𝑚 when 𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) = 𝑚 and 𝑌𝛽 (𝑒) = 𝑚, or 𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) = 𝑚 and 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒) = 𝑚,

or 𝑌𝛽 (𝑒) = 𝑚 and 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒) = 𝑚, or 𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) = 𝑚 and 𝑌𝛽 (𝑒) = 𝑚 and 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒) = 𝑚.
2.4.5 Sensor Dominance Fusion Rule.
The sensor dominance rule applies binary operations ∨ and ∧ on 𝑆 such that ∨ is
applied after applying ∧ to a pair of non-dominating sets. Then the new classifier
𝑆𝐷 ( )
𝑅Α,Β,Γ
𝑒 for three classifiers becomes
𝑆𝐷 ( )
𝑅Α,Β,Γ
𝑒 = 𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) ∨ (𝑌𝛽 (𝑒) ∧ 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒)) for all 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸,

(39)

where 𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) is a dominating classifier. A new classifier family ℛ 𝑆𝐷 under sensor
dominance is generated as
𝑆𝐷
ℛ 𝑆𝐷 = {𝑅Α,Β,Γ
: 𝛼 ∈ Α, 𝛽 ∈ Β, γ ∈ Γ}.

(40)

𝑆𝐷 ( )
Therefore, the new classifier produced under the sensor dominance rule, 𝑅Α,Β,Γ
𝑒 , labels

an event 𝑒 as misinformation 𝑚 when the dominating classifier labels the event as
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misinformation or both non-dominating classifiers labels the event as misinformation.
𝑆𝐷 ( )
That is, 𝑅Α,Β,Γ
𝑒 = 𝑚 when 𝑋𝛼 (𝑒) = 𝑚 or both 𝑌𝛽 (𝑒) = 𝑚 and 𝑍𝛾 (𝑒) = 𝑚.

2.5 Distributed Representations of Topics
2.5.1 Literature Review.
Generally speaking, topic modeling is a task of natural language processing
(NLP) discovering latent semantic structures in a large corpus. Topic modeling can help
identify themes or topics such as politics or health within a large volume of text.
Distributed representations of topics was used as a central building block in constructing
the framework in this thesis via a topic modeling and semantic search algorithm
employed here, top2vec [34]. Although the framework did not use the most popular
function of the top2vec algorithm (topic modeling), it took advantage of the powerful
semantic search function. Since the top2vec algorithm was motivated by improving the
topic modeling method, a brief review of four topic modeling methods follows: Latent
Semantic Analysis (LSA), Probabilistic Latent Semantic Analysis (PLSA), Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), and distributed representations of topics (top2vec) which is
shown in Section 2.5.2.
Popular topic modeling can be traced back to 1990 when Latent Semantic
Analysis (LSA) was introduced by Deerwester et al. [35]. LSA lives in vector space and
uses eigenvectors and eigenvalues from Singular Value Decomposition to approximate a
matrix containing word counts per document. In particular, LSA is approximating any
rectangular matrix 𝑀 of 𝑡 × 𝑑 dimension where 𝑡 is the terms found in corpus and 𝑑 is
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documents via decomposing 𝑀 as a product of three matrices: 𝑀 = 𝑇𝑆𝐷. Such a
decomposition is called singular value decomposition because matrices 𝑇 and 𝐷 have
orthonormal columns and 𝑆 is diagonal. Furthermore, 𝑇 and 𝐷 are matrices of left and
right singular vectors and 𝑆 is the diagonal matrix of singular values. The approximation
of 𝑀 is accomplished by keeping the first 𝑘 highest values of the singular values in the
diagonal matrix 𝑆 and setting the remaining smaller values to zero. Geometrically, the
“rows of the reduced matrices of singular vectors are taken as coordinates of points
representing the documents and terms in a 𝑘 dimensional [factor] space.” [35] Thus, the
approximation of 𝑀 has the best possible least-square-fit to 𝑀 by choosing an ideal 𝑘,
i.e., number of topics being modeled. There are a few limitations of LSA. First, as
Deerwester et al. stated in their work, “the choice of 𝑘 is critical to our work” as a small
value of 𝑘 might undermine the real structure of the original dataset and a large value of
𝑘 might lead the model to overfit “noise or irrelevant detail in the data.” However, this 𝑘,
the choice of dimension or the number of topics, is assumed to be known while in reality
it hardly is. Second, the LSA has a polysemy problem in which each polysemy word is
only represented as only one point in the vector space. That is, “a word with more than
one entirely different meaning (e.g., “bank”), is represented as a weighted average of the
different meanings.” Besides dimension and polysemy issue, stemming, phrasal entries,
and similarity measure posed as challenges for LSA due to LSA’s nature of
representation in raw vector methods. Furthermore, LSA has a strict distribution
assumption that words and documents form a joint gaussian model while in practice, a
Poisson distribution has been observed instead.
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About a decade later, Thomas Hofmann greatly improved LSA to Probabilistic
Latent Semantic Analysis (PLSA) [36]. PLSA made the evolution from a vector space to
a probabilistic generative model where a document is generated and then that document
generates words. A model's parameters are determined by Monte Carlo simulation
together with an Expectation/Maximization step used to determine the initial parameters.
However, there are a few drawbacks with PLSA, in particular, documents are generated
from the existing documents; new documents cannot be generated and thus cannot be
estimated.
From 2003 to present, Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [37] remains a popular
method for topic modeling. LDA is a fully generative probabilistic model of a corpus
whose documents are represented as random mixtures of latent topics and each topic is
represented as a distribution of words. The goal of LDA is to identify components of a
corpus with the highest probability of a corpus and documents. LDA generative process
is represented in a plate notation [37] fitted to a small dataset is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4 is an illustration of the plate notation where the illustration is inspired by a video
overview of LDA by Luis G. Serrano [38]. The orange boxes are “plates” representing
replicates which are repeated entities. The bottom outer plate represents documents,
while the inner plate represents the repeated word position in a given document, and each
position is associated with a choice of topics and words. Suppose we have a corpus
consisting of 𝑀 number of documents and each document contains 𝑁 number of words
while 𝐾 is a predetermined number of topics. LDA model has two Dirichlet distributions
where 𝛼 is the parameter of the Dirichlet prior on the document-topic distribution which
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is represented as a triangle in the figure and 𝛽 is the parameter of the Dirichlet prior on
the topic-word distribution which is illustrated as a tetrahedron. The parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽
are corpus-level parameters assumed to be sampled once in the process of generating a
corpus. 𝜃 is the topic distribution for a document – document-level variables sampled
once per document. 𝜑 is the word distribution for a topic – topic-level variables sampled
once per topic. The random variable 𝑧 follows a multinomial distribution and consists of
a list of topics. 𝑤 is a list of words where each word is chosen from a multinomial
probability conditioned on the topic, 𝑃(𝑤|𝑧, 𝜑). The variables 𝑧 and 𝑤 are word-level
variables and are sampled once for each word in each document. Note that 𝑤 is greyed
out because words in 𝑤 are the only observable variables while all other variables are
laten variables. Following the generative process, components of a corpus with the
highest probability of a corpus and documents can be identified. As a result, LDA gives
more information on the word for each topic. However, LDA assumes the
dimensionality 𝑘 of the Dirichlet distribution, and thus the dimensionality of the topic
variable 𝑧, that is, the number of topics, to be known and fixed while in practice it is
rarely known. A newer method, distributed representations of topics by top2vec,
addressed this issue and waived the requirement of such an assumption. The next section
discusses distributed representations of topics.
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Figure 4. Plate Notation for LDA with Dirichlet-Distributed Topic-Word
Distribution Fitted to a Small Dataset
2.5.2 Top2vec.
Different from the probabilistic generative models such as PLSA and LDA,
distributed representations of topics by top2vec capitalizes on the well-known distributed
representation of documents and words and finds topic vectors in the jointly embedded
document and word semantic space [34]. Finding topic vectors is the core function of
top2vec, and it requires three existing algorithms and four steps to achieve this goal.
Next four paragraphs discuss these four steps: (1) create jointly embedded document and
word vectors; (2) create lower dimensional embedding of document vectors; (3) find
dense areas of documents; (4) finally calculate the centroid of document vectors, that is, a
topic vector, in each dense area.
34

First, top2vec has three options to learn jointly embedded document and word
vectors, one of which used in our research, the Distributed Bag of Words (DBOW) as
found in the embedded doc2vec [39] function. The DBOW structure is similar to the
word2vec skip-gram model [40] where context word is used to predict its surrounding
words within the context window. The difference between DBOW and the skip-gram is
that DBOW uses document vector to predict the surrounding words in the context
window. In particular, by accessing this feature, the top2vec function first builds on an
embedding space where distance between document vectors and word vectors measures
their semantic relationships. This semantic relationship is characterized by cosine
similarity. Cosine similarity is the cosine of the angle between two vectors; it is also a
normalized dot product so that vector magnitude such as word frequency does not affect
the cosine similarity score. Therefore, on the semantic space, document vectors cluster
closer to each other if they share high semantic similarities and scatter away from each
other if they have low similarity scores. Also, the word vectors positioned around
document vectors are representative of documents nearby.
The second step of calculating topic vectors is to perform dimension reduction on
the jointly document and word embedding semantic space. Within the top2vec function,
the Uniform Manifold Approximation and Projection for Dimension Reduction (UMAP)
[41] may be used to avoid the curse of dimensionality that sparse document vectors
scatter in the high-dimensional semantic embedding space.
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The third step is to identify dense areas of documents in the embedded semantic
space. A dense area can be identified via Hierarchical Density-Based Spatial Clustering
of Applications with Noise (HDBSCAN) [41].
Finally, topic vectors are calculated. So far, a joint document and word
embedding semantic space is created, its dimensions is reduced, and density-based
clustering is identified. Next, from a dense area where multiple document vectors cluster
together sharing a common topic or theme, a topic vector is calculated by taking the
arithmetic mean of a dense area’s clustering document vectors. Therefore, top2vec finds
topic words by recognizing the word vectors located nearest a topic vector via the cosine
similarity scores to the topic vector in the embedded space.
2.6 Methodologies Appliable to COVID-19 Related Literatures
Since the dawn of COVID-19, a plethora of research has been conducted
worldwide on various topics among the pandemic. Research areas among COVID-19
include, but are not limited to, policing [42] [43] [44], mental health [45] [46] [47],
countering misinformation on social media [48], misinformation detection [13] [14] [49]
[50] [51] , misinformation diffusion [13] [52] [53], and descriptive analysis such as
sentiment analysis [13] [14] [54] [55] and topic modeling [13] [56] [57]. Four COVID19 related works to which the methodologies in this research are applicable are briefly
discussed in the next four paragraphs. Specifically, these include a summary of COVID19 related literatures on topic modeling, sentiment analysis, misinformation diffusion and
detection.
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Liu et al. investigated the most popular topics among media-directed health
communications and timeliness of Chinese media reporting during the first two months of
the COVID-19 outbreak in China [56]. Liu et al. analyzed 7791 Chinese media reports
collected via a Chinese media content database, WiseSearch, between January 1, 2020,
and February 20, 2020. Latent Dirichlet allocation with a prespecified 20 topics was
applied to model topics of the media reports. They found the top two most popular
themes were prevention and control procedures, and medical treatment and research.
They concluded that there was a time lag between Chinese mass media news reporting
and the major developments of the spread of the virus.
Basiri et al. conducted a studied on sentimental context of social media posts
during the early outbreak of COVID-19 in these eight countries: United States, China,
Iran, Italy, Spain, Australia, England, and Canada [54]. Basiri et al. used the Stanford
Sentiment140 dataset that classifies a post as expressing either positive sentiment or
negative sentiment [58] to train five machine learning base learners: naïve Bayes support
vector machines, convolutional neural network, bidirectional gated recurrent network,
fastText, and DistilBERT. Then, a stacked generalization mechanism was used to train a
meta learner fusing the five base learners. Finally, Basiri et al. collected Twitter data
from the eight countries during the timeframe 2020-01-24 to 2020-04-21 and applied the
meta learns to the Twitter data. They found that the general Twitter users expressed the
highest negative sentiment when infected cases or mortality rate increased. They also
found that the highest positive sentiment appeared when the highest recoveries were
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reported. As an interesting finding, there was less fluctuations in the percent of Tweets’
sentiments for English speaking countries.
Singh et al. is another descriptive analysis of the ecosystem of the information
sources relating to COVID-19 shared by Twitter users [52]. They analyzed the network
link structure among three groups of information source on Twitter: high-quality health
sources (credible), traditional news sources, and low-quality information sources
(misinformation). Singh et al. extracted URLs from Twitter posts via hashtags relating to
COVID-19 between 2020-01-16 and 2020-04-15 which amounts to 11.2 million Tweets,
1.5 million quotes, and 54.5 million retweets that were shared. Then, they extracted the
domains from the URLs and built an information sources network displaying the
connections based on the number of times a domain from an URL is shared among the
three groups of information sources. Singh et al. found that while posts that share URL
whose domain contains misinformation make references to posts that share URL whose
domain comes from credible sources and vice versa, misinformation URLs are shared at a
greater rate than credible URLs. Also, the highest connectivity of news sources indicates
the important role of news outlets made available to information consumers on social
media platforms. One limitation that Singh et al. pointed out and should be noted is that
the content from a shared URL was not considered when determining the credibility of
the information sources. That is, a post is considered credible high-quality health sources
solely based upon the domain of the source such as the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention while in this study a post is labeled misinformation if a post contains an URL
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that points to a website identified as propagating misinformation specifically related to
COVID-19.
Sharma et al. presented a dashboard tracking sentiments, topics, and trends as
well as misinformation diffusion and detection on Twitter social media relating to
COVID-19 [13]. They collected Twitter posts from March 1, 2020 to June 5, 2020
totaling to 54.32 million of English Tweets worldwide. For misinformation detection,
Tweets with URLs were categorized into fake news or not fake news by fact-checking the
domain of URLs in the Tweets. In other words, Tweets were classified as fake news
based on the news source but not the news content. Out of the fake news category,
Tweets were further classified into four subcategories. For misinformation diffusion,
original fake news was tracked via retweet/reply in a directed graph. The dashboard
offers a few examples of highly circulated fake news regarding fake news’ geospatial and
temporal tracing along with topics, sentiments and trends on Twitter at a given time.
In conclusion, most publications on social media COVID-19 misinformation
detection and diffusion stop at the foundation of classifying fake news and general
discussion on dispersion of fake news. Some offered dashboard for visualization of the
fake news propagation through time and space. However, to the best of the author’s
knowledge to date, there has not been any publication on user oriented/interactive system
that allows users to search topic of interests relating COVID-19 misinformation on social
media. Thus, this research aims to build a human-in-the-loop framework for enabling an
interactive process to ingest a human input for a topic of interest then provide both
recommended keywords semantically similar to and accurately related to the human input

39

as well as related documents. Specifically, the human-in-the-loop framework digests any
dataset in a form of text through natural language processing. It then takes advantage of
a text mining algorithm for topic modeling and semantic search in order to take a user’s
topic of interest in a form of either keywords or a sentence and return keywords that are
semantically similar to the user input topic. The novel aspect of this framework is that it
then makes recommendations on the ideal number of keywords as well as identifying
such keywords along with each word’s probability of being in a target category. The
selection of the ideal set of keywords is based on the best classification performance.
That is, the ideal set of keywords scores the highest in accurately being contained in the
context of documents containing at least one of the ideal set of keywords whose
document is correctly identified for a specific targeted category. The framework ideally
should work for any dataset comprised of natural language communication; this thesis
illustrated the proof of concept and applied this framework to a COVID-19 Twitter
dataset.
2.7 Summary
The above methods reviewed in this chapter were integrated to achieve the
objectives mentioned in Chapter I. The first realization of integrating natural language
processing (NLP), machine learning (ML), and fusion methods was used to address
Objective 1 and 2. The results of these two objectives were presented at the IEEE
National Aerospace & Electronics Conference which is reprinted with minor revisions in
Chapter III. Integration of NLP, ML, and distributed representations of topics were
formulated to achieve Objective 3. The full process and results can be found in Chapter
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IV which is a planned submission to IEEE Transactions on Computational Social
Systems journal.
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III. Sensor Fusion for Context Analysis in Social Media COVID-19 Data
3.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter is a reprint (with minor revisions) of a conference paper presented at
the 2021 IEEE National Aerospace & Electronics Conference (NAECON) [14]. This
chapter demonstrated the application of natural language processing, machine learning,
and fusion in achieving Objective 1 and 2. The entirety of the paper except the
Bibliography section begins with the next section. The NAECON paper Bibliography
section may be found in thesis supplementary material under Bibliography.
3.2 Abstract
The growing surge of misinformation among COVID-19 can pose great hindrance
to truth, it can magnify distrust in policy makers and/or degrade authorities’ credibility,
and it can even harm public health. Classification of textual context on social media data
relating to COVID-19 is an effective tool to combat misinformation on social media
platforms. In this research, Twitter data was leveraged to develop classification methods
to detect misinformation and identify Tweet sentiment with respect to COVID-19. Six
fusion-based classification models were built fusing three classical machine learning
algorithms: multinomial naïve Bayes, logistic regression, and support vector classifier.
The best performing models were selected to detect misinformation and to classify
sentiment on Tweets that were created during early outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic and
the fifth month into pandemic. We found that majority of the public held positive
sentiment toward all six types of misinformation news on Twitter social media platform.
Except political or biased news, general public expressed more positively toward
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unreliable, conspiracy, clickbait, unreliable with political/biased, and clickbait with
political/biased news later in the summer month than earlier during the outbreak. The
results provide decision or policy makers valuable knowledge gain in public opinion
towards various types of misinformation spreading over social media.
Keywords—sensor fusion, sentiment analysis, misinformation analysis, social
media, COVID-19
3.3 Introduction
On Feb 2, 2020, the World Health Organization identified information among
then Novel Coronavirus as a massive “infodemic” [59]. Nine main themes of COVID-19
disinformation were summarized by [60]. One of the main disinformation themes is
medical science such as symptoms, diagnosis, and treatments. Timely and accurate
information is crucial in disease control and prevention, especially in a world of instant
news and feeds. However, disinformation and misinformation of COVID-19 have been
spreading rapidly through social media networks, influencing public’s emotion and action
towards certain types of disinformation or misinformation. Combating misinformation
on social media platforms is an ongoing battle. Researchers leveraged immense opensource data to conduct various analyses pertaining to COVID-19. Hossain et al. released
a dataset containing 6761 expert-annotated Twitter Tweets to support misinformation
detection of COVID-19 statements [61]. S. Boon-Itt and Y. Skunkan discovered the
public’s awareness and perception of the COVID-19 pandemic with respect to public
health through the lens of topic modeling and sentiment analysis on Twitter data [62].
Jang et al. also employed topic modeling for sentiment analysis of the COVID-19
43

Tweets, but differ in using human-in-loop aspect-based sentiment analysis [63]. Most
researchers took advantage of machine learning (ML) algorithms for classification tasks,
and some found incorporating sensor fusion to be useful in various ways. Sensor fusion
is a process combining various sensory data as a mean to achieve better performance.
Basiri et al. developed a novel classification model fusing five ML algorithms using a
stacked generalization method to classify sentiment of COVID-19 Tweets in eight
countries [54]. The performance of the fusion-based model surpassed all other ML
algorithms.
This research seeks to achieve two objectives: 1. Provide knowledge discovery
of general public’s sentiment toward different types of misinformation regarding
COVID-19 news. 2. detect sentiment changes regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and
its misinformation over time. To answer these two questions, we first developed two
separate classification methods: (1) the classification of sentimental context and (2) the
classification of textual context, i.e., misinformation narrative. Six fusion-based
classification models were built fusing three classical ML algorithms: multinomial naïve
Bayes (NB), logistic regression (LR), and support vector classifier (SVC) with a linear
kernel. Six fusion rules based on Boolean mathematical expressions for AND, OR,
majority vote, and sensor dominance were applied. We then compared the six fusionbased models among the three ML algorithms and selected the best performing model to
be the classification method for sentiment context classification and for misinformation
narrative classification. The best performing model was selected based on model
accuracy and true positive rate. Lastly, we applied unsupervised ML to two sets of
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COVID-19 Tweets employing sentimental context classification and misinformation
narrative classification.
Our research procedure followed the data science trajectory (DST) introduced by
[64]. Figure 5 is a customized DST for this research. In this paper, section 3.4 covers
data source exploration, data acquisition, data value exploration, data preparation, result
exploration, and modeling. Section 3.5 goes over evaluation, and section 3.6 finishes
with production exploration.

Figure 5. Customized Data Science Trajectory Inspired by [64] for COVID-19
Twitter Sentiment and Misinformation Analysis
3.4 Methods
3.4.1 Data Source Exploration (Step 0) and Data Acquisition (Step 1).
Due to popularity among the public and readily accessible datasets, social media
Twitter Tweets were identified as data source for this study (Step 0). We acquired four
Twitter datasets to examine sentiment towards misinformation regarding COVID-19
(Step 1). Dataset (i) has 1.6 million Tweets between April 6 and June 25, 2009, with two
sentiment labels: negative and positive. Dataset (ii) contains 39,675 Tweets from March
9 to April 24, 2020, with four COVID-19 narratives, i.e., four misinformation categories:
unreliable, conspiracy, clickbait, and political/biased. Dataset (iii) are COVID-19 Tweets
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during early outbreak of the pandemic from February 1 to April 29, 2020 and contains no
truth labels with respect to sentiment or narrative. Dataset (iv) includes COVID-19
Tweets during a summer month from July 25 to August 29, 2020, again contains no truth
labels for sentiment or narrative. Dataset (i) [65], (iii) [66], and (iv) [67] were acquired
from Kaggle, an online community of data scientists who share data. Dataset (ii) was
retrieved from the Twitter application programming interface (API) service using Tweet
ids in [13]. Of the 65,150 source Tweet IDs acquired from [13], only 39,675 Tweets
were successfully retrieved from Twitter API due to a large change in Tweet status from
public to private or from Tweet deletion.
3.4.2 Data Value Exploration (Step 2).
Datasets (i) and (ii) were used to build a sentiment classifier and a misinformation
classifier, respectively. Datasets (iii) and (iv) were used as the application for our
research objectives. These details follow.
3.4.2.1.

Sentiment dataset or dataset (i).

A classifier for sentiment was created using dataset (i). We randomly sequestered
20% of the data (320,000 Tweets) as a test dataset and used the remaining 80%
(1,280,000 Tweets) as training and validation datasets. Table 1 shows a snippet of the
sentiment dataset in which the sentiment column contains the assigned truth label.
Positive sentiment is not limited to happy or joyous and can include approval (1st Tweet)
and somewhat neutral sentiment (3rd Tweet). Negative sentiment includes disapproval
(2nd Tweet) and disappointment (last Tweet). Positive and negative sentiments were split
50/50 for both the test, training and validation datasets. The average length for a Tweet is
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13.58 characters with a standard deviation of 7 characters. The 75th percentile is 19
characters.
Table 1. Sample Tweets from Sentiment Dataset
Sentiment Tweets
Positive

@viviansessoms Short version - it's like Twitterberry, but BETTER.
http://ubertwitter.com/

Negative

hates prank callers at 10 o'clock in the morning especially when they try to put on
an indian accent and they sound scottish/jamacan

Positive

@yateoh Hello twitter noob What phone do u have at the moment? tweet me via
web 1st lah

Negative

@shaddih I emailed the billshare author to ask if the site would stay online for a
long time, he never wrote back

3.4.2.2.

Misinformation dataset or dataset (ii).

A classifier for misinformation was created using dataset (ii). Following the same
80%-20% data splitting procedure as for dataset (i), the test set for misinformation had
7,935 Tweets and the training/validation sets had 31,740 Tweets. The misinformation
dataset labels were generated by [13] using three fact-checking sources: Media Bias/Fact
Check [68], NewsGuard [69], and Zimdars [70]. Each Tweet fell into one or more
misinformation categories defined as follows.
•

Unreliable: Includes false, partially false, rumorous, and/or unverified
news.

•

Conspiracy: Contains conspiracy theories and false/questionable scientific
claims.
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•

Clickbait: Misleading Tweets to attract attention for reliable or unreliable
news.

•

Political/biased: Biased Tweets supporting political agendas for reliable or
unreliable news.

Each Tweet could be labeled with more than one misinformation category, which
resulted in 14 combinations of misinformation labels. Table 2 shows samples for four
out of the 14 combination labels. Due to Tweets containing possibly more than one label,
we created a misinformation classifier based on two labeling methods: individual label
and combined label.
Table 2. Sample Tweets from Misinformation Dataset
Unreliable

Conspiracy

Clickbait

Political

Tweets

/Biased
unreliable

Imagine that! Democrats lying about a
national emergency to try to damage
President Trump, and the corporate
propaganda media nodding their heads
and wiping their chins. Biden repeated the
lie at the last debate. Hard to believe!
\nhttps://t.co/zeqNDvXRh7

unreliable

'Our hospitals are on their knees': Italian
doctor is warning over #coronavirus
https://t.co/vieNqJ2QEG
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conspiracy

New York Firefighters Won't Respond To
Coronavirus Calls | Zero Hedge
https://t.co/v2JlYl0gW

conspiracy

This is very disturbing.\nWhy Is the US
Apparently Not Testing for the COVID19 Coronavirus? https://t.co/6DVLpxlnyK

unreliable

political/

Coronavirus is exposing Trump's

biased

unsuitability to handle a crisis Washington Examiner
https://t.co/chy4c4fNbd via
@GoogleNews

unreliable

political/

Italy Extends Quarantine to the Entire

biased

Country Over Coronavirus\n\n

How to

hurt your economy
https://t.co/qfKDHnu2zG
clickbait

political/

Brutal new ad contrasts Trump’s

biased

coronavirus happy talk with accelerating
number of US infections https://t.co/cz1hWw1k4M

clickbait

political/

Here's the anti-Trump coronavirus ad we

biased

were all eager to see
https://t.co/TWMk9vniOI
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Individual label. For the individual label analysis, we developed four classifiers
each designated to classify one of the four misinformation categories. For each classifier,
we reconstructed the truth label to be a binary class labeling “yes” if the Tweet contains
the type of misinformation category and “no” if it does not. For example, from Table 2 if
we want to develop an “unreliable” classifier, we relabel the first two Tweets and the 5th
and 6th Tweets as “yes” and the rest as “no”. Figure 6 displays the binary class counts for
each misinformation classifier. Overall, the classes are relatively balanced with a slight

Count of Each Class

skew towards “no” in conspiracy class.
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0

yes
16,995
(43%)

22,680
(57%)

32,914
(83%)

6,761
(17%)

no

25,383
(64%)

14,292
(36%)

14,346
(36%)

25,329
(64%)

Misinformation Category

Figure 6. Tweet Count of the Binary Class for Each Misinformation Category
Combined label. From the whole dataset (ii), the two highest frequencies of
multi-misinformation labels are the pairs of clickbait and political/biased (12,003 Tweets,
30.25%) and unreliable and political/biased (6,018 Tweets, 15.17%). For these two
combinations, we developed a classifier to classify four misinformation outcomes: the
Tweet is in both misinformation categories, the Tweet is in one but not the other
category, or the Tweet is in neither category. Frequency counts of the four outcomes for
both combinations are given in Figure 7. For both combinations, more than half the data
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is labeled as “neither”, whereas the combined clickbait and political/biased label contains
about 25% of the data, but in contrast, the combined unreliable and political/biased label
is rarer (< 1%).

Count of Each Class

political/biased
clickbait + political/biased
clickbait
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
-

unreliable + political/biased
unreliable
neither

20,980 (52.88%)

25,206 (63.53%)
65 (0.16%)

10,276 (25.9%)

12,003 (30.25%)

6,018 (15.17%)
2,401 (6.05%)
Combination 1

2,401 (6.05%)
Combination 2

Misinformation Category

Figure 7. Tweet Count of the Multi-Class for Two Combined Misinformation
Categories: Unreliable and Political/Biased, Clickbait and Political/Biased
3.4.3 Data Preparation/Text-preprocessing (Step 3).
Text preprocessing is a crucial step in preparing social media data because the
raw text is unstructured and extremely noisy. All four dataset Tweets underwent baseline
text-preprocessing (BTP) step which includes using regular expressions to remove nonalphabetic characters and symbols, etc. The first column in Table 3 is a snippet of three
original Tweets from dataset (i) and the second column shows examples of our BTP.
Depending on the ML algorithm for the sentiment classifier, three additional
normalization methods were applied after this baseline text-preprocessing step: Natural
Language Toolkit (NLTK) Stop Words, Porter Stemmer [19], and WordNet Lemmatizer
[20]. NB used only BTP, LR included the Porter Stemmer processing (Table 3 3rd
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column), and SVC used all three normalization methods (Table 3 4th column). Datasets
(ii), (iii), and (iv) used only BTP.
Table 3. Data Preparation: Pre and Post Text-Preprocessing
Normalized Text –

Normalized Text –

Normalized

Baseline

Partial

Text – Full

Amazing, many of this

amazing many of

amaz mani of thi

amaz current

current &quot;cabinet&quot;

this current quot

current quot cabinet

quot cabinet

appear to have believed that

cabinet quot appear

quot appear to have

quot appear

our Tax system is definitely

to have believed that

believ that our tax

believ tax

voluntary

our tax system is

system is definit

definit voluntari

definitely voluntary

voluntari

blasted internet is soooo slow

blasted internet is

blast internet is soo

blast internet

due to this storm, everything

soo slow due to this

slow due to thi

soooo slow

is taking double time to load

storm everything is

storm everyth is

storm take

can't seem to access most of

taking double time

take doubl time to

doubl time load

the pages !!!!

to load cannot seem

load can not seem

access page

to access most of the

to access most of

pages

the page

im gutted really am

im gut realli am

Original Text

@mattblissett im gutted
really i am!

3.4.4 Classification Algorithms (Steps 4 and 5).
3.4.4.1.

Feature extraction.
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im gut realli

We considered two ways to extract features for our classification tasks: (1) word
counts using Scikit-learn Count Vectorizer [71] and (2) weighted word counts using a
measure of how often words appear in Tweets using term frequency inverse document
frequency (TFIDF). The NB algorithm was developed using Count Vectorizer feature
extraction and both the LR and SVC were developed Scikit-learn TFIDF Vectorizer [72].
3.4.4.2.

Algorithms.

We selected three classical ML algorithms as sentiment and misinformation
classifier candidates and compared their performance for dataset (i) and (ii). (1) NB
algorithm contains a probabilistic classifier technique selecting a class with the highest
computed posterior probability for a given Tweet by applying Bayes’ rule with the bag of
words assumption and conditional independence assumption. Specifically, we used the
Scikit-learn multinomial naïve Bayes (NB) [25] as the classifying algorithm. (2) Like
NB, LR contains a probabilistic classifier, but differs in that the classifier is comprised of
a set of tunable parameters, weights, and bias. For the LR algorithm, we used Scikitlearn linear model logistic regression [27]. (3) SVC contains a classifier that fits either a
linear or nonlinear boundary between classes by expanding the input feature space using
kernel functions. For this research, we used Scikit-learn SVC with a linear kernel [28].
We built a pipeline streamlining TFIDF Vectorizer with LR and SVC and found the
optimal hyperparameter set using five-fold cross validation in grid search. Elastic net
was used as a penalty to prevent overfitting the LR model.
3.4.4.3.

Fusion rules (Step 5).
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For each sentiment dataset and misinformation dataset, the NB, LR and SVC were
used to classify outcomes. We then used Boolean fusion rules to ensemble these three
algorithms and evaluated the merit of these rules in prediction performance. There are
six fusion rules introduced for this research. Sentiment analysis and the first part
(individual labels) of misinformation analysis follow the individual label fusion rules for
binary outcomes while the second part (multi-label) of misinformation analysis adhere to
combined label fusion rules.
Individual label fusion rules. These rules apply to the binary outcome (yes/no for
a given label). Figure 8 illustrates these individual label fusion rules via a Venn diagram.
Figure 8 (a) through (c) represent Tweets predicted by each of the three algorithms as
positive sentiment and are put inside the circle while negative sentiment is outside of the
circle. Figure 8 (d) shows the AND rule which will only predict positive sentiment when
all three algorithms predict positive. Figure 8 (e) demonstrates that the OR rule predicts
positive sentiment when at least one algorithm predicts positive sentiment. Figure 8 (f)
Majority Vote rule predicts positive sentiment when at least two algorithms predict
positive sentiment. The last three fusion rules (Figure 8 (g)-(i)) are based on sensor
dominance. The prediction takes on the dominating algorithm prediction unless the other
two algorithms both disagree. For example, NB sensor dominance fusion rule predicts
positive sentiment when NB predicts positive sentiment unless both LR and SVC predict
negative sentiment.
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Figure 8. Venn Diagram for Binary Class Fusion Rules Fusing Three Algorithms
Combined label fusion rules. These rules were used in the second part of the
misinformation analysis for the combined labels of (1) political/biased with unreliable
and (2) political/biased with clickbait. Recall, each combination produces four labels,
therefore, the Boolean rules had to be extended to four potential outcomes using label
ordering. Combinations include label = 1 (both unreliable (or clickbait) and
political/biased); = 2 unreliable (or clickbait); = 3 political/biased; = 4 neither labels.
Table 4 lists five fusion rules and their algorithm predictions for all four labels. The
Boolean AND rule and sensor dominance were applied with the same logic as given in
the individual label fusion rule, however, two types of OR rules were used depending on
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assumed ordering. OR(1) emphasizes predicting unreliable (clickbait) misinformation
Tweet over political/biased Tweets while OR(2) has these two reversed. Further,
Majority Vote logic became more complicated when all three algorithms disagreed with
each other. For example, we assigned a Tweet as a 3 if one algorithm predicted a Tweet
as 3, one algorithm predicted a 1, and the third algorithm predicted a 4. The three
algorithm predictions would be (3, 1, 4), and order within these predictions does not
matter. Thus, (3, 1, 4) results in the same fused label as (1, 3, 4) which is listed in Table
4 under majority vote intersects political/biased.
Table 4. Fusion Rules for Both Sets of Combined Labels: Political/Biased with
Unreliable or with Clickbait
Fusion

Rules/Notes

AND

Predicts a label on which
all three algorithms
agree; if one or more
algorithms does not agree
then label neither.

OR(1)

Ordering: 4 Neither < 3
Political/biased < 2
Unreliable (or Clickbait)
< 1 both
Ordering: 4 Neither < 2
Unreliable (or Clickbait)
< 3 Political/biased < 1
both
At least two algorithms
agree on a label. If all
three algorithms disagree
and if there is (a) no 1,
then label 4; (b) no 2,
then label 3; (c) no 3,
then label 2; (d) no 4,
then label 1. Order does
not matter inside the
parentheses.

OR(2)

Majority
Vote

1
Both
(1, 1, 1)
or only
1s.

2 Unreliable
(or Clickbait)
(2, 2, 2)
or only 2s.

3 Political/
biased
(3, 3, 3)
or only 3s.

If there
is a 1.

If there is no
1 but there is
a 2.

If there
is a 1.

If there are no
1 and 3, but
there is a 2.

If there are
no 1 and 2,
but there is
a 3.
If there is
no 1, but
there is a 3.

(1, 1, 1),
(1, 1, 2),
(1, 1, 3),
(1, 1, 4),
(1, 2, 3).

(2, 2, 1),
(2, 2, 2),
(2, 2, 3),
(2, 2, 4),
(1, 2, 4).

(3, 3, 1),
(3, 3, 2),
(3, 3, 3),
(3, 3, 4),
(1, 3, 4).
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4
Neither
All
others
except
only 1s,
2s, and
3s.
(4, 4, 4).

(4, 4, 4).

(4, 4, 1),
(4, 4, 2),
(4, 4, 3),
(4, 4, 4),
(2, 3, 4).

Sensor
Dominance

Predict on dominating
algorithm label unless the
other two algorithms both
agree on a different label.
First number is the
dominating algorithm
prediction. (m, n) is a set
of the other two
algorithm predictions
where m, n = 1, 2, 3, 4
and m is not equal to n.

3.4.4.4.

1 (m, n),
1 (1, 1),
2 (1, 1),
3 (1, 1),
4 (1, 1).

2 (m, n),
1 (2, 2),
2 (2, 2),
3 (2, 2),
4 (2, 2).

3 (m, n),
1 (3, 3),
2 (3, 3),
3 (3, 3),
4 (3, 3).

4 (m, n),
1 (4, 4),
2 (4, 4),
3 (4, 4),
4 (4, 4).

Performance metrics.

We calculated the true positive rate (TPR), false positive rate (FPR), and accuracy
to evaluate algorithm performance. TPR, or hit rate, is the quotient of true positives
(TPs) over sum of TPs and false negatives (FNs). The FPR, or false alarm rate, is the FPs
divided by the sum of FPs and true negatives (TNs). Accuracy is the sum of TPs and
TNs over the total number of observations.
3.5 Results (Step 6)
3.5.1 Sentiment Analysis Results: dataset (i).
Figure 9 shows the TPR and FPR for sentiment dataset. Without fusion, LR
scored the highest TPR (81.3%) and second best FPR (21.2%). NB had the lowest TPR
and FPR Of the fusion rules, the OR rule received the highest TPR, but also the highest
FPR whereas the AND rule had the lowest TPR and FPR. If we value the hit rate more
than false alarms, four out of six fusion rule algorithms performed better than all three
algorithms without fusion. Thus, fusion outperformed individual algorithm in predicting
true positives. Figure 10 displays 95% confidence interval (CI) accuracy of predicting
sentiment. The three algorithms without fusion all performed fairly well with at least
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76% accuracy. The best performing algorithm was LR having 80% accuracy. While
SVC performed the worst (76%), it was still better than chance. The six fusion rules
improved the NB and SVC algorithms. LR sensor dominance and majority vote were the
best performing fusion rules, though, not significantly different. Although comparable,
LR alone performed significantly better than any fusion rule in the sentiment analysis.

20.0%
21.2%
26.0%
13.3%
33.0%
20.9%
23.3%
23.3%
28.2%

False Positive Rate

76.5%
81.3%
79.5%
69.8%
87.5%
80.0%
81.5%
82.7%
83.3%

True Positive Rate
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Naive Bayes (NB)
Support Vector Classifier (SVC)
OR Rule
Dominance_NB
Dominance_SVC

Logistic Regression (Logreg)
AND Rule
Majority Vote
Dominance_Logreg

Accuracy

Figure 9. True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate for Sentiment Dataset
0.805
0.8005
0.7971
0.800
0.7955
0.795
0.7907
0.790
0.7826
0.785 0.7823
0.780
0.7753
0.7721
0.775
0.7674
0.770
0.765
0.760

Figure 10. Prediction Accuracy with 95% Confidence Interval by Algorithm for
Sentiment Dataset
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3.5.2 Misinformation Analysis Results: dataset (ii).
3.5.2.1.

Individual label results.

Figure 11 to Figure 14 present the TPR and FPR predicting each individual
misinformation label across algorithms. For predicting each type of misinformation, the
OR rule performed the best in TPR and the worst in FPR whereas the AND rule
performed the best in FPR and the worst in TPR. For predicting unreliable
misinformation Tweets, all algorithms scored above 80% in TPR except the AND rule
(76%). Conspiracy misinformation, performed the worst holistically across algorithms
when compared with predicting other three types of misinformation Tweets with respect
to TPRs, however, produced the lowest FPRs overall. For clickbait, all algorithms
produced TPRs above 74% except two that produced 66%. Political/biased TPRs were
generally the highest across algorithms (above 90%) except for two algorithms (84% and
87%). Figure 15 to Figure 18 illustrate accuracy with 95% CI predicting each individual
misinformation label across algorithms. For each plot, SVC performed the best. Notice
that most fusion rules improve NB and LR.

90%
80%

Naive Bayes

82.5%
85.6%
87.1%
75.9%
92.7%
86.5%
88.4%
88.6%
88.7%

100%

Logistic Regression
Support Vector
Classifier
AND Rule

70%

25.6%
31.4%
24.9%
18.2%
37.8%
25.9%
29.8%
32.6%
27.2%

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

OR Rule
Majority
Dominance_NB
Dominance_Logreg

10%
0%

Dominance_SVC
True Positive Rate

False Positive Rate
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Figure 11. True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate for Predicting Unreliable
Naive Bayes
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Figure 12. True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate for Predicting Conspiracy
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Figure 13. True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate for Predicting Clickbait
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Figure 14. True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate for Predicting Political/Biased
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Figure 15. Accuracy with 95% Confidence Interval for Predicting Unreliable
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Accuracy
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Figure 16. Accuracy with 95% Confidence Interval for Predicting Conspiracy
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Figure 17. Accuracy with 95% Confidence Interval for Predicting Clickbait
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Figure 18. Accuracy with 95% Confidence Interval for Predicting Political/Biased
3.5.2.2.

Combined label results.

Figure 19 and Figure 20 display the class specific TPRs for the four labels by
algorithm for combination (1) and (2). Comparing all 10 algorithms, OR(1) and OR(2)
fusion rules achieved highest TPR in predicting unreliable with political/biased in Figure
19 and clickbait with political/biased in Figure 20. Figure 21 and Figure 22 show the
overall accuracy with 95% CI for predicting four labels in each combination. SVC
performed the best among all algorithms in both combinations. For combination in
Figure 21, all fusion rules except AND improved NB and LR. For combination in Figure
22, Majority Vote and the three sensor dominance fusion rules performed not
significantly different than the best performing SVC algorithm. Though the OR rules
scored the second lowest in overall accuracy in Figure 22, but they performed not
significantly different than NB, LR, and the AND fusion rule. They also performed the
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best in TPR seen in Figure 20. One may consider applying OR fusion rule in the
combined labels prediction.
100%
90%
80%
70%
56% 56%
60%
51%
50% 40% 39%
43% 44% 44% 44%
40%
30%
30%
20%
10%
0%

unreliable +
political/biased

unreliable

poitical/biased

neither

Figure 19. True Positive Rate for Four Labels by Algorithm for Combinations
Unreliable and Political/Biased. Data Labels Are Shown for Combined
Misinformation Category (Blue Squares)
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61%80% 80%
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50%
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clickbait

political
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Figure 20. True Positive Rate for Four Labels by Algorithm for Combinations
Clickbait and Political/Biased. Data Labels Are Shown for Combined
Misinformation Category (Blue Squares)
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Figure 21. Overall Accuracy with 95% Confidence Interval for Predicting
Combinations Unreliable and Political/Biased
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Figure 22. Overall Accuracy with 95% Confidence Interval for Predicting
Combinations Clickbait and Political/Biased

3.5.2.3.

Application results (datasets iii and iv).

Figure 23 presents percentage of positive sentiment for each misinformation
category. Negative sentiment percentage is not shown but can be calculated as 100%
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minus the positive sentiment percentage. By simple majority rule, i.e., over 50%,
majority of the general public held positive sentiment towards all misinformation
regarding COVID-19 news on Twitter social media for both during the early pandemic
outbreak and a summer month in August 2020. For all misinformation category except
political/biased, general public expressed more positively later in the summer month than
earlier during the outbreak. General public’s sentiment towards COVID-19 political or

Percentage of
positive sentiment

biased type of misinformation news remains relatively unchanged over time.
75%
73%
70.56%
71%
69%
67%
65%
63%
61%
59%
57% 57.74%
55%

71.58%

72.90%

71.75%

73.65%

70.82%
70.17%

67.55%
62.48%

63.14%

63.49%
Feb-Apr
Jul-Aug

Misinformation category

Figure 23. Percentage of Positive Sentiment for Each Misinformation Category.
Blue Circle is for Early COVID-19 Outbreak from Feb 1 to Apr 29 and Orange
Triangle is the 5th Month into COVID-19 from July 25 to Aug 29
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion (Step 7)
Classification of textual context (misinformation narrative) on social media data
relating COVID-19 is an effective tool to combat misinformation on social media
platforms. We took advantage of the large-scale Twitter data and developed two
classification methods to classify sentimental context and misinformation narrative. The
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results have been consistently showing fusion-based models can improve classification
performance. For all analyses, fusion-based model outperformed the three classical ML
algorithms in predicting TPR. Though no fusion-based model scored highest based on
accuracy, several fusion-based accuracy scores were not significantly different than that
of the best performing ML algorithm. Based on these performance metrics, we selected
logistic regression algorithm as sentimental context classification method, support vector
classifier as individual misinformation narrative classification method, and OR fusionbased algorithm as combined misinformation narrative classification method. Applying
the selected classification methods to COVID-19 Tweets that were created during the
early outbreak of the pandemic and the fifth month into the pandemic, we found that
majority of the public held positive sentiment toward all six types of misinformation
news on Twitter social media platform. It should be noted that positive sentiment
includes expression of approval, hope, excitement, and even somewhat neutral in addition
to sentiments such as happy or joyous. We also noticed that the over 70% of the public
expressed positively towards all misinformation news at the fifth month into the
pandemic. Vast majority (>70%) of the public Tweeted most positively toward political
or biased misinformation news during the early outbreak of COVID-19, but the
percentage of the positive sentiment toward the same misinformation news remained
almost unchanged at the latter month. For all misinformation category except
political/biased, general public expressed more positively later in the summer month than
earlier during the outbreak.
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Although most algorithms performed fairly well, there are a couple of ways we
can explore in improving algorithm performance. For feature extraction, additional
pruning method can help to further reduce the number of features. We also consider
adding random forest as well as neural networks to our ML model candidates. Since
misinformation categories labels were not distributed evenly with large amount of Tweets
were labeled unreliable, we considered expand the training dataset by either regenerating
misinformation labels using the existing algorithm or using other labeled dataset such as
the one produced by [61].
3.7 Acknowledgment
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official
guidance or position of the United States Government, the Department of Defense or of
the United States Air Force. The material was assigned a clearance of CLEARED AS
AMENDED on 21 Sep 2021. Originator Reference Number: 1030AFIT2021ENC09023.
Case Number: 2021-0745 (original case number(s): MSC/PA-2021-0388; 88ABW-20210797).

68

IV. A Framework for Keywords Identification Via Semantic Analysis in
Application to COVID-19 Misinformation on Social Media
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter addressed Objective 3 and is a planned submission to the IEEE
Transactions on Computational Social Systems journal. This chapter demonstrated the
application of natural language processing, machine learning, and distributed
representations of topics in achieving Objective 3, a framework for keyword
identification via semantic analysis.
4.2 Introduction
Information consumers are susceptible to misinformation about the COVID-19
pandemic due to the fast-changing information environment [73]. Not only the United
States Surgeon General, Dr. Vivek Murthy, recognized that COVID-19 misinformation
has been spreading at unprecedented speed and scale [4], but also the World Health
Organization (WHO) anticipated the spread of information during the pandemic to be a
crisis of its own and characterized the massive flow of information as “infodemic” [5].
Just a few months after the WHO statement on infodemic, in September 2020, the WHO
and other international organizations published a joint statement acknowledging that misand disinformation among COVID-19 can be harmful to an individual’s health both
physically and mentally, misinformation destroys lives, and disinformation polarizes
public’s opinions [11]. Dr. Murthy further assessed the impact of health misinformation
as a serious threat to public health because it can “cause confusion, sow mistrust, harm
people’s health, and undermine public health efforts” [4]. Dr. Murthy specified various
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sectors of the society to act upon the call for a whole-of-society effort in confronting
COVID-19 health misinformation. Specifically, researchers and research institutions are
called to increase vigilance on health questions, concerns, and misinformation via
different mediums of information flow and study approaches [4].
Since the dawn of COVID-19 existence, a plethora of research has been
conducted worldwide on various topics among the pandemic. Research areas among
COVID-19 include, but are not limited to, policing [42] [43] [44], mental health [45] [46]
[47], countering misinformation on social media [48], misinformation detection [13] [14]
[49] [50] [51], misinformation diffusion [13] [52] [53], and descriptive analysis such as
sentiment analysis [13] [14] [54] [55] and topic modeling [13] [56] [57]. Most
publications on social media COVID-19 misinformation detection and diffusion stop at
the foundation of classifying fake news and general discussion on dispersion of fake
news. Some offered dashboard for visualization of the fake news propagation through
time and space.
However, to the best of the author’s knowledge to date, there has not been any
publication on user oriented/interactive process that allows users to search topics of
interest relating COVID-19 misinformation on social media. Thus, this paper aims to
build a human-in-the-loop framework for enabling an interactive process to ingest a
human input for a topic of interest then provide both recommended keywords
semantically similar to and accurately related to the human input as well as related
documents. Specifically, the human-in-the-loop framework digests any dataset in a form
of text through natural language processing. It then takes advantage of a text mining
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algorithm for topic modeling and semantic search in order to take a user’s topic of
interest in a form of either keywords or a sentence and return keywords that are
semantically similar to the user input topic. The novel aspect of this framework is that it
then makes recommendations on the ideal number of keywords as well as identifying
such keywords along with each word’s probability of being in a target category. The
selection of the ideal set of keywords is based on the best classification performance.
That is, the ideal set of keywords scores the highest in accurately being contained in the
context of documents containing at least one of the ideal set of keywords whose
document is correctly identified for a specific targeted category. The framework ideally
should work for any dataset comprised of natural language communication; this thesis
illustrated the proof of concept and applied this framework to a COVID-19 Twitter
dataset. A diagram of the interactive framework workflow is shown in Figure 24 and is
described in detail in the Methodology section.
The next section will provide background on the semantic search algorithm
employed in the data application, top2vec. Section 4.4 presents construction of the novel
framework. Section 4.5 poses preliminary results of the COVID dataset application.
Section 4.6 proposes conclusion and future work.
4.3 Background
The human interactive framework developed in this work is an integration of
natural language processing (NLP), classical machine learning (ML), and distributed
representations of topics techniques. NLP and ML implementations were inherited from
Smith et al. [14]. Distributed representations of topics was used as a central building
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block in constructing the framework via a topic modeling and semantic search algorithm
employed here, top2vec [34]. Although the framework did not use the most popular
function of the top2vec algorithm (topic modeling), it took advantage of the powerful
semantic search function. Since top2vec was motivated by improving the topic modeling
method, a brief review of topic modeling follows.
Generally speaking, topic modeling is a task of NLP discovering latent semantic
structures in a large corpus. Topic modeling can help identify themes or topics such as
politics or health within a large volume of text. Four topic modeling methods will be
discussed briefly: Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA), Probabilistic Latent Semantic
Analysis (PLSA), Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), and distributed representations of
topics (top2vec).
Popular topic modeling can be traced back to 1990 when Latent Semantic
Analysis (LSA) was introduced by Deerwester et al. [35]. LSA lives in vector space and
uses eigenvectors and eigenvalues from Singular Value Decomposition to approximate a
matrix containing word counts per document. In particular, LSA is approximating any
rectangular matrix 𝑀 of 𝑡 × 𝑑 dimension where 𝑡 is the terms found in corpus and 𝑑 is
documents via decomposing 𝑀 as a product of three matrices: 𝑀 = 𝑇𝑆𝐷. Such a
decomposition is called singular value decomposition because matrices 𝑇 and 𝐷 have
orthonormal columns and 𝑆 is diagonal. Furthermore, 𝑇 and 𝐷 are matrices of left and
right singular vectors and 𝑆 is the diagonal matrix of singular values. The approximation
of 𝑀 is accomplished by keeping the first 𝑘 highest values of the singular values in the
diagonal matrix 𝑆 and setting the remaining smaller values to zero. Geometrically, the

72

“rows of the reduced matrices of singular vectors are taken as coordinates of points
representing the documents and terms in a 𝑘 dimensional [factor] space.” [35] Thus, the
approximation of 𝑀 has the best possible least-square-fit to 𝑀 by choosing an ideal 𝑘,
i.e., number of topics being modeled. There are a few limitations of LSA. First, as
Deerwester et al. stated in their work, “the choice of 𝑘 is critical to our work” as a small
value of 𝑘 might undermine the real structure of the original dataset and a large value of
𝑘 might lead the model to overfit “noise or irrelevant detail in the data.” However, this 𝑘,
the choice of dimension or the number of topics, is assumed to be known while in reality
it hardly is. Second, the LSA has a polysemy problem in which each polysemy word is
only represented as only one point in the vector space. That is, “a word with more than
one entirely different meaning (e.g., “bank”), is represented as a weighted average of the
different meanings.” Besides dimension and polysemy issue, stemming, phrasal entries,
and similarity measure posed as challenges for LSA due to LSA’s nature of
representation in raw vector methods. Furthermore, LSA has strict distribution
assumption that words and documents form a joint gaussian model while in practice, a
Poisson distribution has been observed instead.
About a decade later, Thomas Hofmann greatly improved LSA to Probabilistic
Latent Semantic Analysis (PLSA) [36]. PLSA made the evolution from a vector space to
a probabilistic generative model where a document is generated and then that document
generates words. A model's parameters are determined by Monte Carlo simulation
together with an Expectation/Maximization step used to determine the initial parameters.
However, there are a few drawbacks with PLSA, in particular, documents are generated

73

from the existing documents; new documents cannot be generated and thus cannot be
estimated.
From 2003 to present, Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [37] remains a popular
method for topic modeling. LDA is a fully generative probabilistic model of a corpus
whose documents are represented as random mixtures of latent topics and each topic is
represented as a distribution of words. The goal of LDA is to identify components of a
corpus with the highest probability of a corpus and documents. LDA model has two
Dirichlet distributions: 𝛼 is the parameter of the Dirichlet prior on the document-topic
distribution; 𝛽 is the parameter of the Dirichlet prior on the topic-word distribution. The
parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 are corpus-level parameters assumed to be sampled once in the
process of generating a corpus. 𝜑 is the word distribution for a topic – topic-level
variables sampled once per topic. The random variable 𝑧 follows a multinomial
distribution where the parameter 𝜃 is the topic distribution for a document – documentlevel variables sampled once per document. 𝑧 consists of a list of topics. 𝑤 is a list of
words where each word is chosen from a multinomial probability conditioned on the
topic, 𝑃(𝑤|𝑧, 𝜑). The variables 𝑧 and 𝑤 are word-level variables and are sampled once
for each word in each document. In addition, distributions of words are not only
generated by each topic, but also generated by the whole corpus. Thus, LDA gives more
information on the word for each topic. However, LDA assumes the dimensionality of
the Dirichlet distribution, that is, the number of topics, to be known and fixed while in
practice it is rarely known. A newer method, distributed representations of topics by
top2vec, addressed this issue and waived the requirement of such an assumption.
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Different from the probabilistic generative models such as PLSA and LDA,
distributed representations of topics by top2vec capitalizes on the well-known distributed
representation of documents and words and finds topic vectors in the jointly embedded
document and word semantic space [34]. Top2vec is a function written in Python that
contains several features of topic modelling in one package. Finding topic vectors is the
core function of top2vec, and it requires three existing algorithms and four steps to
achieve this goal. The next four paragraphs discuss these four steps as applicable to our
framework: (1) create jointly embedded document and word vectors; (2) create lower
dimensional embedding of document vectors; (3) find dense areas of documents; (4)
finally calculate the centroid of document vectors, that is, a topic vector, in each dense
area.
First, top2vec has three options to learn jointly embedded document and word
vectors, one of which used in our research, the Distributed Bag of Words (DBOW) as
found in the embedded doc2vec function. The DBOW structure is similar to the
word2vec skip-gram model where context word is used to predict its surrounding words
within the context window. The difference between DBOW and the skip-gram is that
DBOW uses document vector to predict the surrounding words in the context window.
In particular, by accessing this feature, the top2vec function first builds on an embedding
space where distance between document vectors and word vectors measures their
semantic relationships. This semantic relationship is characterized by cosine similarity.
Cosine similarity is the cosine of the angle between two vectors; it is also a normalized
dot product so that vector magnitude such as word frequency does not affect the cosine
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similarity score. Therefore, on the semantic space, document vectors cluster closer to
each other if they share high semantic similarities and scatter away from each other if
they have low similarity scores. Also, the word vectors positioned around document
vectors are representative of documents nearby.
The second step of calculating topic vectors is to perform dimension reduction on
the jointly document and word embedding semantic space. Within the top2vec function,
the Uniform Manifold Approximation and Projection for Dimension Reduction (UMAP)
may be used to avoid the curse of dimensionality that sparse document vectors scatter in
the high-dimensional semantic embedding space.
The third step is to identify dense areas of documents in the embedded semantic
space. A dense area can be identified via Hierarchical Density-Based Spatial Clustering
of Applications with Noise (HDBSCAN).
Finally, topic vectors may be calculated. So far, a jointly document and word
embedding semantic space is created, and its dimensions is reduced, and density-based
clustering is identified. Next, from a dense area where multiple document vectors cluster
together sharing a common topic or theme, a topic vector is calculated by taking the
arithmetic mean of a dense area’s clustering document vectors. Therefore, in this
process, topic words are recognized via cosine similarity scores of the word vectors
located nearest a topic vector in the embedded space.
4.4 Methodology
This section will discuss each step of the human interactive framework workflow
as shown in Figure 24. The novel part of building this framework lies in a few steps.
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First, the framework processes misinformation classification through categorizing a
document as a specific type of misinformation. Then, the first human interaction with the
framework is entering an inquiry which is illustrated in Figure 24, the greyed-out
rectangular box. The topic model (top2vec) returns 𝑘 keywords (𝑘 = 50 keywords were
produced by top2vec) ranked by their similarity scores. The second human interaction
with the framework occurs at deciding if the initial set of 𝑘 keywords are satisfactory.
This step is shown in the greyed-out diamond decision shape of Figure 24, human
qualification assessment of the keywords. A criteria for judging satisfaction could be the
quality of keywords. If the human is unsatisfied with the preliminary product, then the
framework goes back to refine the topic model and then prompts the human to input an
inquiry again. The loop continues until the human is satisfied with the keyword
candidates, then it will end the loop and goes to the next step. The framework divides
𝑘 keywords into 𝑘 sets of keywords where the latter set of two consecutive sets contains
one more keyword than the former set. Thus, the number of keywords in the 𝑘 sets of
keywords ranges from one keyword, two keywords, three keywords, all the way to 𝑘
keywords. Next, for each set of keywords, documents containing at least one of those
keywords are extracted. Finally, the system recommends an optimal set of keywords
along with its mathematical properties for user. Each of the steps of the human
interactive framework is now discussed in reference to the dataset we used for
application.
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Figure 24. Human-in-the-Loop Interactive Framework Workflow. Human
Interaction Occurs in Two Greyed Out Steps
4.4.1 Ingest Dataset.
The dataset used in this analysis is the same dataset used for misinformation
analysis in Smith et al.’s work [14] which acquired the original dataset from Sharma et al.
[13]. Since the publication of Sharma et al. in October 2020 till mid-January 2022, there
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were 69 papers cited Sharma et al. according to Google Scholar. Twelve of these papers
either erroneously cited Sharma et al., duplicate each other, or published in a non-English
language. Of the remaining 57 English papers that correctly cited Sharma et al., none
used Sharma et al.’s dataset. Note that Smith et al. was the only work that took
advantage of this dataset since Sharma et al.’s publication. The work in this paper
continued to expand on Smith et al.’s work using the same dataset.
The dataset was retrieved from the Twitter application programming interface
(API) service using tweet ids in [13] between 03-09-2020 and 04-24-2020. Of the 65,150
source tweet IDs acquired from [13], only 39,675 tweets were successfully retrieved from
Twitter API due to a large change in tweet status from public to private or from tweet
deletion. This set of data also comes with misinformation labels. The misinformation
labels were generated using fact-checking sources categorizing each Tweet according to
the domain of the URL shared in a Tweet. Each Tweet was labeled one or more of the
four misinformation categories: unreliable, conspiracy, clickbait, and political/biased.
More detail regarding misinformation labels can be found in [13] and [14].
4.4.2 Natural Language Processing.
Natural language processing of text can help reduce noise and improve structure
of the text. As the second step in the framework (Figure 24), the dataset underwent
baseline text-preprocessing which includes using regular expression to replace emojis and
smileys with the word “happy or “sad” accordingly; case folding which converts all
words to lowercase; replacing contractions such as “didn’t” with its long form “did not”;
removing non-alphabetic characters such as numbers and symbols, non-ASCII characters,
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mentions, urls, retweet “RT”, and single letters; replacing punctuations with a space; and
replacing three or more identical consecutive letters with two letters. Various
normalization methods can be applied after the baseline text-preprocessing step, in
particular, stop words removal and lemmatization. We considered NLTK Stop Words list
which contains 179 commonly used words that carry little semantic information. There
are two types of lemmatizations we applied. Frist, Porter Stemmer is a process for
removing the more common morphological and inflexional endings from words in
English [19]. Second, WordNet Lemmatizer removes affixes only if the resulting word is
in WordNet dictionary [20]. As a result of WordNet Lemmatizer, plural words such as
“bats”, “babies”, and “geese” will be reduced down to its singular form “bat”, “baby”,
and “goose”, respectively.
As an additional piece to the NLP step, various NLP tasks were tried in this work
as a check point for quality keywords returned by the algorithm, top2vec. In particular,
we compared and contrasted these NLP combinations during the fine-tuning stage: no
NLP performed (process raw data), baseline NLP, lemmatization, Porter stemming, apply
stop words then perform lemmatization, and lastly, apply stop words then perform
stemming.
4.4.3 Binary Classification of Documents.
Since some Tweets may be labeled with more than one misinformation category,
for simplicity, Tweets were relabeled into a binary category either a yes or no regarding
its misinformation narrative. That is, a Tweet is labeled a targeted misinformation
narrative if the Tweet has that specified misinformation label. Therefore, this created
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four sets of classification tasks since each Tweet can be thought of as either a specific
target misinformation or not where a target misinformation being one of the four labels.
For example, in Table 2, the first two Tweets and the 5th and 6th Tweets are labeled
“unreliable”; the last four Tweets are labeled “political/biased”; the 3rd and 4th Tweets
have only “conspiracy”; and the last two Tweets are also “clickbait”. Figure 6 displays
the binary class counts for each misinformation classifier. Overall, the classes are
relatively balanced with a slight skew towards “no” in the conspiracy class. The binary
classification of documents is important for a later task evaluating and selecting the best
performing set of keywords representing the most similar keywords to a human inquiry.
4.4.4 Build Topic Model.
Once the training dataset underwent NLP, then the topic model was built. Here,
we used specifically the top2vec algorithm which incorporated three preexisting
functional algorithms of our specific interest to find topic vectors. This section will
discuss how to choose the optimal set of hyperparameters to reach a best performing set
of keywords as demonstrated for our dataset.
The first step is to build a jointly embedding semantic vector space. There are
four options to achieve this goal. We selected the Bag of Words method to build this
space (found in the doc2vec option) due to its ability to learn large and unique vocabulary
dataset with better results. Further, doc2vec also trains the model from scratch which is
different from the rest of the embedding options. Within doc2vec, training speed and
min_count were two hyperparameters fined tuned for this work. We compared training
speeds “learn” and “deep-learn” then selected the “learn” option because it learned better
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quality vectors than “fast-learn” option and took less time to train than “deep-learn”
option. The min_count hyperparameter controls the minimum value of the total
frequency of a word. Min_count removes rare words with total frequency less than a
specified threshold in which higher values remove more rare words and lower values
keep more rare words. The values considered for min_count are 10, 15, 30, and 50.
The second step of building a topic model is to perform a dimension reduction
technique via UMAP. We fine-tuned two hyperparameter of UMAP, n_neighbors and
embedding_dimension. N_neighbors is a number of nearest neighbors. It balances
preserving global structure vs local structure in low dimension embedding. Lower values
focus on local structure hence finding more dense areas, that is, more topics. The values
considered for n_neighbors are 15, 30, 45, 60, and 75. The embedding_dimension is the
number of dimensions in the reduced embedding space since UMAP scales well in large
datasets with high dimensional data. The default value within the top2vec function for
embedding_dimension is five, but we also considered reducing the embedding dimension
to two for visualization and for parameter selection purposes.
The third step is to identify dense areas of document vectors via HDBSCAN.
Minimum_cluster_size is a critical parameter determining clusters of different density in
HDBSCAN. It is a minimum value, i.e., minimum number of documents, to be
considered a cluster. Higher value tends to have more noise as the model mergers
unrelated documents. The numbers considered for this dataset are 15, 30, and 45.
A few combinations of the above hyperparameters are as follows. First, we took
every combination of min_count with values of 10, 30, 50, n_neighbors with values of
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15, 45, 75, and minimum_cluster_size with values of 15, 45, 75. We then generated
models with these combinations, setting the embedding_dimension to 2 for visualization
and selection purposes. After evaluation, four additional combinations with
embedding_dimension set to 2 were considered. Initially, the parameters selected were
based on the clustering visualization. However, since our human interactive system is
concerned about the quality of the keywords, further parameter fine-tuning was
considered based on either semantic quality of words or the performance of such words.
Therefore, 20 more combinations were added to the hyperparameter fine-tuning task.
This 20-combination fine-tuning was reached after the model returned the initial keyword
set and is discussed further in Section 4.4.6. Table 5 below shows the combinations
considered to fine tune hyperparameters for this section.
4.4.5 Human Input Topic of Interest and Natural Language Processing
Human Input.
Top2vec has a built-in function for semantic search of similar words to a user
inquiry. To personalize this semantic search function, we added NLP to prepare the
inquiry such that the inquiry undergoes a consistent NLP as the training dataset. In
particular, the framework will normalize and tokenize a user inquiry into words. The best
performing top2vec model will identify 50 most semantically similar words to a human
inquiry of “COVID start lab.” This initial human inquiry has somewhat domain
knowledge due to literature search in this thesis work. Therefore, the initial inquiry has a
particular interest in the COIVD-19 origin, especially regarding a laboratory. Keep in
mind that the training dataset containing Tweets during the late March and mid-April in
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the early outbreak of the pandemic. Therefore, the origin of COVID-19 started in a
laboratory was considered a conspiracy during that timeframe.
Table 5. Hyperparameter Fine-Tuning Combinations Part 1
min_count

n_neighbors

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

15
15
15
45
45
45
75
75
75
15
15
15
45
45
45
75
75
75
15
15
15
45
45
45
75
75
75
45
60
60
60

minimum_cluster_size
15
45
75
15
45
75
15
45
75
15
45
75
15
45
75
15
45
75
15
45
75
15
45
75
15
45
75
30
15
30
45
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embedding_dimension
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

4.4.6 Topic Model Returns 𝒌 Keywords and Human Test.
When a user inputs an inquiry that has been normalized, the topic model returns
the most similar words to the inquiry by using a word similarity score. In our application,
we focused on returning the 50 most similar words, {𝑤1 , 𝑤2 , 𝑤3 , …, 𝑤50 }. The first
word has the highest cosine similarity score indicating that it is most semantically similar
to the inquiry. This step is achieved by the topic model (top2vec) taking an average of
the input word vectors and returning 50 semantically similar words surrounding that
resulting vector. Recall, in Section 4.4.4, this work is concerned with the quality of the
keywords returned by the topic model. Twenty combinations of the modeling
hyperparameters were added to the hyperparameter fine-tuning task to further improve
keyword quality. This step is indicated in Figure 24 “Unsatisfied” decision line going
from “Human test” to “Build topic model”. Table 6 shows the combinations used for
additional hyperparameter tuning.
4.4.7 Calculate Probability of Misinformation Class Given a Word.
Once an initial set of satisfactory keywords is recognized, the system calculates
the probability of a target misinformation class given one of the words in the set. For
example, if “bioweapon” is in the set of keywords, and if the target misinformation class
is conspiracy, then the system calculates the probability of the word “bioweapon” being
categorized as conspiracy conditioning on the word. To perform this task, Bayes rule
was followed and multinomial naïve Bayes algorithm [25] from Scikit-learn [26] was
employed. Specifically, the predict_proba method from the MultinomialNB module was
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used. The conditional probability following Bayes rule shows in Equation (41) and
predict_proba method is formulated as in Equation (42).
Table 6. Hyperparameter Fine-Tuning Combinations Part 2
min_count

n_neighbors

15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

50
50
50
50
50
50
60
60
60
15
15
15
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60

minimum_ embedding_
cluster_size dimension
30
40
50
30
40
50
30
40
50
15
30
45
15
30
45
45
45
45
45
45

𝑃(𝑦|𝑥) =

𝑃(𝑦∩𝑥)
𝑃(𝑥)

2
2
2
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
2
2
2
2
2

normalization
raw dataset
raw dataset
raw dataset
raw dataset
raw dataset
raw dataset
raw dataset
raw dataset
raw dataset
raw dataset
raw dataset
raw dataset
raw dataset
raw dataset
raw dataset
baseline
lemma
stemming
stopword & lemma
stopword & stemming

𝑃(𝑥|𝑦)𝑃(𝑦)

= 𝑃(𝑥|𝑦)𝑃(𝑦)+𝑃(𝑥|𝑦 𝑐)𝑃(𝑦 𝑐 ),

(41)

where
𝑁 +𝛼

∑

𝑥𝑖 +𝛼

𝑖=1

𝑦𝑖 +𝑛𝛼

𝑃(𝑥|𝑦) = 𝑁 𝑦𝑖+𝑛𝛼 = ∑𝑛𝑥∈𝑇𝑁
𝑦

,

(42)

𝑥 is a feature or a word, 𝑦 is a misinformation class, 𝑦 𝑐 is not a misinformation class, 𝑥𝑖
is the 𝑖th feature/word, 𝑦𝑖 is the 𝑖th class, 𝑛 is the number of features/words, 𝑇 is the
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training dataset, 𝑁𝑦𝑖 = ∑𝑥∈𝑇 𝑥𝑖 is the number of times the 𝑖th feature/word appears in
class 𝑦 in the training dataset 𝑇, 𝑁𝑦 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑁𝑦𝑖 is the total number of times each
feature/word appear in class 𝑦 in the training dataset 𝑇, i.e., word count in class 𝑦, 𝛼 is a
smoothing prior accounting for features not present in the training sample to prevent zero
probabilities in calculation. The common default value for alpha is 𝛼 = 1 which is the
Laplace smoothing.
4.4.8 Regroup as 𝒌 Sets of Keywords.
After fine-tuning hyperparameters in the topic model, the system selected a set of
50 keywords (our application set the number of keywords to 50) that are similar to a user
inquiry and higher quality in semantic meaning. Recall, these 50 keywords were listed in
an order of highest similarity score to lowest. That is, {𝑤1 , 𝑤2 , 𝑤3 , …, 𝑤50 } where 𝑤1
has the highest similarity score to human inquiry. Next, 50 sets of keywords were
created such that the first set of keyword contains a keyword with the highest similarity
score, the second set of keywords contains two keywords with top two highest similarity
scores, so on and so forth, until the 50th set of keywords consisting of all 50 keywords
with top 50 highest similarity scores. That is, {𝑤1 }, {𝑤1 , 𝑤2 }, {𝑤1 , 𝑤2 , 𝑤3 }, …,
{𝑤1 , 𝑤2 , 𝑤3 , …, 𝑤50 }.
4.4.9 Extract Documents with One Plus Keyword Per Set.
For each set of keywords(s), the system extracts documents, i.e., Tweets, which
contains at least one or more of the keywords in the set. For example, for the first set of
keywords, the process identifies the word “official” of having the highest similarity score
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among all 50 keywords, then the process searches the normalized training dataset and
extracts Tweets with the word “official”. Suppose the second set of keywords has the
words “official” and “may”, then the system extracts Tweets having at least one of these
two words. That is, the second set of Tweets may contain Tweets with “official” in the
Tweet, or with “may” in the Tweet, or both “official” and “may” in the Tweet. As a
result, 50 sets of Tweets can be written as {𝑑 ∈ 𝐷: 𝑤1 ∈ 𝑑}, {𝑑 ∈ 𝐷: 𝑤1 ∈ 𝑑 ∪ 𝑤2 ∈ 𝑑 },
{𝑑 ∈ 𝐷: 𝑤1 ∈ 𝑑 ∪ 𝑤2 ∈ 𝑑 ∪ 𝑤3 ∈ 𝑑},…, {𝑑 ∈ 𝐷: ⋃50
𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 ∈ 𝑑 } where 𝑑 is a document in
the corpus 𝐷.
4.4.10 Count the number of target documents and Calculate True Positive Rate
and False Positive Rate.
True positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) are the performance metrics
guiding selection of optimal keyword set to recommend to a user. TPR and FPR are
calculated based on confusion matrix which is shown in Figure 25. First, to calculate
TPR, the system counts the number of Tweets in each misinformation class for each set
of Tweets. Recall, Section 4.4.3 lists four types of misinformation classes. Therefore,
for each set of Tweets, there are four values counts where each count is the number of
Tweets in each four misinformation classes. When the counts are divided by the number
of Tweets in the training dataset size individually, one might think these four decimal
values as a proportion of Tweets in a target misinformation class where the target
misinformation class is one of the four misinformation labels: unreliable, conspiracy,
𝑇𝑃

clickbait, and political/biased. That is, define proportion = 𝑃+𝑁 where 𝑇𝑃 is the number
of true positives for the target misinformation label, 𝑃 is the number of Tweets that are
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labeled positive for the target misinformation label. One more count is needed to
calculate TPR, and Figure 6 provides that count. Figure 6 shows the total number of
Tweets labeled in one of the four misinformation classes out of the training dataset.
Therefore, prevalence of each misinformation class is shown as the percentage labeled
“yes” in Figure 6. Equivalently, prevalence of the target class is given as
𝑃

prevalence = 𝑃+𝑁 =

𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
𝑃+𝑁

. Now, TPR for each misinformation class can be calculated as

proportion over prevalence. FPR is calculated similarly to the TPR where proportion is
the number of Tweets not in a target misinformation class over training dataset size and
the prevalence is the percentage labeled “no” in Figure 6.

Figure 25. Confusion Matrix
4.4.11 Select the Ideal Set of Keywords and Return Related Documents.
An ideal set of keywords is selected based on the best classification performance,
i.e., this set of keywords scores the highest in accurately being contained in the context of
documents containing at least one of the ideal set of keywords whose document is
correctly identified for a specific targeted category. In particular, this work set a
threshold on FPR of 0.2 and chose the highest TPR among all 50 sets of Tweets. Once
that particular set of Tweets is identified, the corresponding set of keywords along with
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each word’s probability of being in the target category are selected, and the set of Tweets
is returned for user’s information.
4.5 Results
This section discusses two major results: model results from hyperparameter finetuning and the final product produced by the fine-tuned model. The best topic model was
fine-tuned in three aspects including visualization of the two-dimensional document
vector embedding space, quality examination of the initial set of 50 keywords returned by
the topic model, and ROC performance between two final models. The best topic model
had a high value of min_count and n_neighbors, medium value of min_cluster_size, 2
bedding_dimention with training dataset being processed through baseline NLP and
lemmatization. An optimal set of keywords along with their probabilities of being
classified into one of the misinformation narratives, their word counts, and the model
performance metrics were displayed in a figure.
4.5.1 Visualization Determinant.
Section 4.4.4 introduced 31 combinations of four topic model hyperparameters
which can be viewed in Table 5. Instead of showing all 31 results, the three most
competitive model results are shown in Figure 26, Figure 27, and Figure 28. These three
results are visualizations of the training dataset under different hyperparameter values.
All three models have the following parameter values, 50 min_count and 14 topics, and
they are different in n_neighbors and min_cluster_size with values (30, 15), (45, 45), and
(60, 45) where the first and second element in parentheses corresponding to n_neighbors
and min_cluster_size, respectively. These figures guided the choice of choosing the level
90

of these two varying parameters. The selection criteria included representations which
resulted in denser, connected, and more clustered representations. In Figure 26, though it
is dense, most of the coloring groups are disconnected where they scattered except
perhaps topic 2, 6, and 8 where these three coloring groups remain relatively connected
and not dislocated from one cluster to the other. Figure 27 is a slight improvement from
Figure 26 that fewer coloring groups are disconnected for their main clustering. Yet,
topic 6, 9, and 12 seem to form two geographically separated clusters. Both Figure 26
and Figure 27 seem to have larger outliers due to sparse points located on the far upper
side, right and bottom directions. This is also the reason why the visualizations look
smaller in size compared to the third visualization. Figure 28 might be the most
connected relative to the previous two. Only topic 2 is disconnected and dispersed into
three minor groupings. Topic 4 is observed to be scattered at the bottom and a few to the
right of the figure and maybe several points to the left. The center coloring groups 1, 7,
9, 10, 11 are denser than their surrounding coloring groups, and this model handled noise
butter than the other two models due to less outliers. To conclude, the initial fine-tuning,
hyperparameters in Figure 28 were selected, that is, 50 min_count, 60 n_neighbors,
45min_cluster_size, and 14 topics.
From above, we obtained the first best topic model based on visualization on the
connectedness and denseness of the topics. The best set of hyperparameters from initial
fine-tuning suggests that a lower level of min_cluster_size, medium level of n_neighbors,
and high level of min_count works better in the training dataset.
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Figure 26. Shape Shows a 300 Dimensional Document Vectors Reduced into 2
Dimensions in UMAP. Colors Indicates Dense Areas Identified by HDBSCAN.
Parameters: 30 n_neighbors and 15 min_cluster_size.

Figure 27. Shape Shows a 300 Dimensional Document Vectors Reduced into 2
Dimensions in UMAP. Colors Indicates Dense Areas Identified by HDBSCAN.
Parameters: 45 n_neighbors and 45 min_cluster_size.
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Figure 28. Shape Shows a 300 Dimensional Document Vectors Reduced into 2
Dimensions in UMAP. Colors Indicates Dense Areas Identified by HDBSCAN.
Parameters: 60 n_neighbors and 45 min_cluster_size.
4.5.2 Semantic Quality.
Next, the model was refined with respect to the quality of the keywords returned
by top2vec, and a slight change was implemented in the initial parameter set coupled
with setting Embedding_dimensions to five, taking suggestions from top2vec’s two
training datasets. Column 1 in Figure 29 shows one of the 12 models with five
embedding_dimensions. Most of the keywords in Column 1 have little to no semantic
meanings, and other models with five embedding_dimensions behaved similar to the one
shown in Column 1. Thus, five embedding_dimensions was rejected and two
embedding_dimensions stayed for further examination.
Up to this point in the analysis, all comparisons were done using raw data, that is,
there was no NLP for the training data. As seen in Figure 29 Column 2, words such as
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“covid-”, “covid_”, “https”, and “rt” required some basic NLP in order to remove the
non-informative characters. The next fine-tuning task falls on NLP where five
combinations of NLP were compared and contrasted. Column 3 of Figure 29 shows the
keywords returned by top2vec when the training dataset underwent baseline NLP. The
light orange color highlights are problematic words. There are three forms of one root
word “say” under baseline NLP. Column 4 shows resulting keywords after
lemmatization has been performed on the training dataset. Once again, the words
“origin” and “originated” have the same root word yet they show up twice in a set of 50
keywords. Column 5 shows the training dataset processed using Porter stemming NLP
task. As warned, stemming various tense of words might result in words that are not in
English dictionary, such as the ones highlighted in Column 5. Last two columns added
NLTK stop word list prior lemmatization or stemming task in hopes of removing most of
the low meaning words. As predicted, the settings in Column 7 also has the same issue
as words in Column 5 due to stemming task. This leaves the settings in Column 6 which
seems superior to all other alternatives. Thus, two NLP options were chosen for
comparison in order to generate the most accurate top2vec model. One might note that in
the last six models, the word “scientist” or “scientists” highlighted in yellow appeared in
all models except the one in Column 6. The fact that removing stop words which in turn
reduces the term (or word) dimension results in change of a term vector similarity score.
A slight change in term dimension only affects 1/6 of the model results. This might
suggest a relatively low sensitivity in term dimension reduction.
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Figure 29. Keyword Semantic Quality by Various NLP Tasks
4.5.3 Performance Metric Determinant.
The final two top2vec models were compared by their performance metric, partial
ROC curves. Both models have the same top2vec hyperparameter settings but are
different in normalization. The partial ROC curves in each misinformation class were
compared. Note that partial ROC curves were generated using only a subset of possible
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settings and these partial ROC curves were used as an optimal setting could be found
without the computational expense of creating the entire ROC curve. Conspiracy
misinformation partial ROC curves for both models were chosen as the most drastic
comparison. The model with both stop words and lemmatization NLP tasks, shown in
Figure 30 did not perform as well as the model on which only lemmatization was
performed as shown in Figure 31. The TPR in the latter model is about 30% higher than
that of the first model when holding the FPR at a threshold of 0.2. Partial ROC curves in
other misinformation classes performed in a relatively similar manner as they did in the
conspiracy class for both topic models. Thus, the best top2vec model has lemmatization
NLP task performed.

Figure 30. ROC Curve for Top2vec Model Predicting Conspiracy Employed Stop
Words Removal and Lemmatization
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Figure 31. ROC Curve for Top2vec Model Predicting Conspiracy Employed
Lemmatization
4.5.4 Best Keyword Set Selection.
The best performing top2vec model identified the 50 most semantically similar
words to a human inquiry of “COVID start lab.” This human initial inquiry has
somewhat domain knowledge due to literature search in this thesis work. Therefore, the
initial inquiry has a particular interest in the COIVD-19 origin, especially regarding a
laboratory. Keep in mind that the training dataset contains Tweets during the late March
and mid-April in the early outbreak of the pandemic. Therefore, the origin of COVID-19
started in a laboratory was considered a conspiracy during that timeframe. Thus, Figure
32 shows the 50 keywords produced by the most fine-tuned top2vec model in a
conspiracy misinformation class. Each word on the x-axis has an associated probability
of being categorized as a conspiracy word. The words along the horizontal axis are
ranked in a descending order of their conditional probabilities. The integer above the
probability is the number of times that word appears in the training dataset. The blue
triangle points are the word similarity scores measured by cosine similarity between the
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human initial inquiry and each keyword. Not to our surprise, the first two words having
the root word “origin” are identified as conspiracy keywords that are most similar to the
human inquiry. Keywords in other three misinformation classes are shown in Figure 33,
Figure 34, and Figure 35. Note that the similarity score of each keyword in all four
figures, Figure 32 to Figure 35, remain constant since the similarity is considered
between words and human inquiry.

Figure 32. Top 50 Conspiracy Keywords that Are Most Similar to Words “Covid”,
“Start”, and “Lab”
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Figure 33. Top 50 Unreliable Keywords that Are Most Similar to Words “Covid”,
“Start”, and “Lab”

Figure 34. Top 50 Political/Biased Keywords that Are Most Similar to Words
“Covid”, “Start”, and “Lab”
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Figure 35. Top 50 Clickbait Keywords that Are Most Similar to Words “Covid”,
“Start”, and “Lab”
From the above four sets of keywords, for each misinformation class, 50 sets of
keywords were created where for every two consecutive sets of keywords, the latter set
has one more distinguish word than the previous set. The task at hand is to find the
optimal number of keywords in each misinformation class such that Tweets containing at
least one of the said set of keywords are identified correctly as being spreading a certain
type of misinformation. Partial ROC curves shown from Figure 36 to Figure 39 provide
an analytical measure for completing such task. To limit noise, FPR is set to 0.2, and
highest TPR was identified. The intersection of maximum FPR that is less than 0.2 and
maximum TPR is the number of optimal keywords.
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Figure 36. Conspiracy Misinformation ROC Curve for 50 Sets Keywords

Figure 37. Unreliable Misinformation ROC Curve for 50 Sets Keywords

Figure 38. Political/Biased Misinformation ROC Curve for 50 Sets Keywords
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Figure 39. Clickbait Misinformation ROC Curve for 50 Sets Keywords
From the partial ROC curves above, it is obvious that the set of 50 keywords is
better characterized as conspiracy or unreliable misinformation words rather than the
other two misinformation categories. Thus, the recommended keyword set for
identifying conspiracy misinformation that is similar to the human initial inquiry of
“covid”, “start”, and “lab” contains 21 words that are shown in Figure 40. Figure 40 also
displays the TPR of 0.312 and FPR of 0.2 on the upper left corner as the performance for
these 21 recommended words. Similar observation was made for the recommended
keyword set in the unreliable misinformation class as shown in Figure 41. TPR and FPR
for the 22 recommended keywords being in the unreliable misinformation class are 0.267
and 0.161, respectively. Additional observation in the returned recommended keywords
for both misinformation classes is that on average, roughly 40% of the keywords are
found in both misinformation classes. The distinct keywords are underlined and shown
in Table 7.
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Figure 40. 21 Recommended Conspiracy Misinformation Keywords Similar to
Human Inquiry “Covid”, “Start”, and “Lab”

Figure 41. 22 Recommended Unreliable Misinformation Keywords Similar to
Human Inquiry “Covid”, “Start”, and “Lab”
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Table 7. Recommended Keywords Most Probable and Semantically Similar to
Conspiracy and Unreliable Misinformation
Recommended words Recommended words most semantically similar to covid”,
most probable class
Conspiracy
(21 words, 57% are
distinct)
Unreliable
(22 words, 62% are
distinct)

“start”, “lab”
origin, originated, global, tucker, evidence, infected, wuhan,
expert, end, italian, population, once, which, first, virus,
cause, who, information, show, high, chinese
eu, british, govt, spike, infection, french, started, infected,
wuhan, ship, first, chinese, around, population, global,
scientist, china, may, virus, italian, epidemic, which

4.6 Conclusions
This chapter presented a novel method for a human-in-the-loop interactive
framework integrating natural language processing, machine learning, and distributed
representations of topics to analytically recommend keywords that are similarly and
accurately related to user’s topic of interest. In particular, the interactive framework
digests an inquiry in a form of text from a user and systematically produces a set of
keywords with the highest true positive rate with no greater than 0.2 false positive rate
threshold in model performance metrics for each misinformation class, see Figure 36,
Figure 37, Figure 38, and Figure 39. The system is designed for any texted based
datasets ideally and is applied to an early COVID-19 Twitter dataset as proof-of-concept
research. Figure 24 displays the human-in-the-loop interactive framework workflow for
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this paper. An inquiry “COVID start lab” was a topic of interest of a user, in particular,
interest of the origin of COVID-19 specifically coming from a laboratory. Keep in mind
that the model was trained on a dataset containing Tweets during late March and midApril in the early outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, the origin of COVID19 started in a laboratory was considered a conspiracy during that timeframe. The
preliminary results show promising traits of the system. Out of the four types of
misinformation classes, unreliable, conspiracy, clickbait, and political/biased, both
unreliable (Figure 37) and conspiracy (Figure 36) classes performed better than the other
two based on the partial ROC curves. This also indicates the semantic meaning of the
user inquiry tends to have a similar conspiracy or unreliable misinformation rather than
being in the clickbait or political/biased category. As a final product of the system, two
sets of keywords were recommended for user’s information. The interactive framework
recommended 21 words that are conspiracy related and most semantically similar to the
user inquiry (Figure 40) as well as 22 words recognized to be unreliable and most
semantically similar to the user inquiry (Figure 41). Both Figure 40 and Figure 41 further
display the probability of each word being classified as a conspiracy and unreliable,
respectively, along with each word count and word similarity score. Additionally,
performance metrics, true positive rate and false positive rate, for selecting these two sets
of keywords are displayed on the top left corner in Figure 40 and Figure 41 accordingly.
For future studies, one may consider a context analysis on the recommended
keywords since there are about 40% of the words overlapped. It is also natural to
consider a cost analysis for selecting the distinct keywords instead of selecting the whole
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recommended set. Lastly, one may also investigate the improvement on a fully
automated framework such that domain knowledge from a human is not required.
There are a few limitations and recommendations to this work. First, the
evaluation of the best top2vec model in Section 4.5.1 is based on human eye
interpretation of denseness and connectiveness of the coloring groups, i.e., topic groups.
A numerical evaluation of the visualization is an open research topic. Additionally in the
same section, due to resource constrain, three to at most five levels of settings were
considered when fine-tuning the top2vec model among the three hyperparameters.
Subsequently, Section 4.5.2 also use human interpretation of the semantic quality of the
keywords produced by top2vec. Combining the above limitation on evaluation of the
top2vec model performance using the Tweeter dataset, one may consider a five-fold cross
validation and grid search the most optimal model base on ROC curves performance
metric.
Next limitation is on the built-in method within top2vec. We encountered a
crucial issue when a user enters an out of vocabulary word in an inquiry, i.e., a word that
does not appear in the training dataset, top2vec semantic search function returns an error.
Even if a human enters a word that can be found in the training dataset, this same error
can still occur. The reason is that the default requirement for the minimum count of a
word appearing in the training dataset is 50 times. If a word only appears 49 times, it still
won’t make the cut and is error bound. This minimum count of a word is a
hyperparameter in doc2vec algorithm which can be tuned according to operational
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requirements. This work considered different values for the minimum count parameter
and found that higher value tends to work well.
As noted in previous work [14], the conspiracy misinformation class is
imbalanced for having 17% of the data being relabeled as conspiracy while the other
classes achieve at least 36% and some are as high as 64%. Due to the imbalanced nature
for the conspiracy class, the resulting keywords produced by the fine-tuned top2vec
model are all predicted to be not probable as conspiracy words. All 50 keywords from
the conspiracy misinformation class have lower than 0.5 probability being assigned as
conspiracy. Yet, the partial ROC for the conspiracy class outperformed all others. This
once again proved performance metrics such as ROC or partial ROC is more robust to
imbalanced data than is the conditional probability used in this work. But, there are other
remedies to address imbalanced data issue. One might consider up-sampling technique
which increases the samples in the underrepresented class or minority class. The
opposite of up-sampling is down-sampling which removes samples in the
overrepresented classes or the majority classes provided that the amount of samples in
these classes are abundant and remain sufficient in quantity after reduction. The second
solution, Chawla et al. proposed a Synthetic Minority Over-Sampling Technique which
combined method of oversampling the minority class and undersampling the majority
class [74]. The third solution could be through changing the loss function via weights.
When multiplying the loss with the term in which a minority class occurs with a constant
value greater than 1, the classifier is forced or encouraged to pay more attention to the
minority class. The forth and also the last solution to resolve imbalanced data is another
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reweight technique. Cui et al. proposed a reweighting scheme that use the effective
number of samples for each class to rebalance the loss which results in a class-balanced
loss [75].
The fourth challenge of this work is acquiring a gold standard dataset. This work
is based on the dataset curated and labeled by Sharma et al. yet the dataset labels were not
labeled by human, rather, via factchecking sources [13]. Therefore, each Tweet with one
or more misinformation label was solely dependent on the domain of the URLs shared in
the Tweet, and content of the Tweet was not considered in identifying misinformation
Tweets. Labeling a post on social media or news article based on domain of the news
source is prevalent in recent research works [76][77][78][79]. Micallef et al. recognized
that a very small percentage, 10%, of Tweets include external links and hence, developed
a novel COVID-19 related dataset including 4,800 Tweets annotated by human such that
each Tweet is labeled as one of the three categories: misinformation, countermisinformation, and irrelevant [80]. However, Micallef et al. dataset was only concerned
about COVID-19 misinformation on fake cures and 5G conspiracy theories. Clearly, a
gold standard dataset that examines the content of a post is lacking. Furthermore, the
standard for COVID-19 misinformation classification is a controversial topic since
recommendations and assessments may change over time due to new and updated
scientific evidence, according to the United States Surgeon General, Dr. Vivek Murthy
[4]. Using the example in this work, the origin of COVID-19 in a laboratory was
considered a conspiracy in the beginning of the outbreak in 2020. However, in May of
2021, the U.S. president ordered intelligence community to investigate the origins of
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COVID-19 including the theory of the virus potentially coming from a Chinese
laboratory [81]. What was once firmly held to be a pure conspiracy theory is now under
investigation with inconclusive official conclusions made public [82]. This makes the
subject to be exceedingly nebulous, and only serves to add to the level of uncertainty
within the general public. Conspiracy theories as such are challenging to categorize into
a binary of most likely true versus most likely untrue because of their shifting perception
among both the public and the public officials investigating them. This generates an
exponentially difficult scenario for scientific researchers to firmly and confidently
debunk these statements accurately as time can shift perception of them from most likely
untrue to controversial to possibly true as the investigation is ongoing. A solution to this
challenge in categorizing the data is to increase transparency in the information made
available to the research community and the general public as the president advocates for
a “full and transparent accounting” of the pandemic [82].
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Chapter Overview
This last chapter of the thesis concludes the results of the research in both Chapter
III and Chapter IV, states the importance of the research, and lastly provides
recommendations for future research.
5.2 Conclusions of Research
5.2.1 Conclusion for Sensor Fusion for Context Analysis.
Classification of textual context (misinformation narrative) on social media data
relating COVID-19 is an effective tool to combat misinformation on social media
platforms. In Chapter III, we took advantage of the large-scale Twitter data and
developed two classification methods to classify sentimental context and misinformation
narrative. Specifically, Tweets were classified as either having a positive sentiment or
negative sentiment. At the same time, each Tweet was categorized as one of the six
categories: unreliable, conspiracy, clickbait, political/biased, unreliable and
political/biased, and clickbait and political/biased. The results demonstrate that fusionbased models can improve classification performance. The six Boolean fusion rules used
in this work are AND, OR, majority vote, naïve Bayes sensor dominance, logistic
regression sensor dominance, and support vector classifier sensor dominance. For all
analyses, fusion-based model outperformed the three classical machine learning,
multinomial naïve Bayes, logistic regression, and support vector classifier in predicting
misinformation by true positive rate performance metric. Though no fusion-based model
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scored highest based on accuracy performance metric, several fusion-based accuracy
scores were not significantly different than that of the best performing machine learning
algorithm. Based on these performance metrics, we selected logistic regression algorithm
as sentimental context classification method, support vector classifier as individual
misinformation narrative classification method, and OR fusion-based algorithm as
combined misinformation narrative classification method. Applying the selected
classification methods to COVID-19 Tweets that were created during the early outbreak
of the pandemic and the fifth month into the pandemic, we found that majority of the
public held positive sentiment toward all six types of misinformation news on Twitter
social media platform. It should be noted that positive sentiment includes expression of
approval, hope, excitement, and even somewhat neutral in addition to sentiments such as
happy or joyous. We also noticed that the over 70% of the public expressed positively
towards all misinformation news at the fifth month into the pandemic. Vast majority
(>70%) of the public Tweeted most positively toward political or biased misinformation
news during the early outbreak of COVID-19, but the percentage of the positive
sentiment toward the same misinformation news remained almost unchanged at the latter
month. For all misinformation category except political/biased, general public expressed
more positively later in the summer month than earlier during the outbreak.
5.2.2 Conclusion for A Human Interactive Process for Recommended
Keywords.
There has not been any publication on a user oriented/interactive process that
allows users to search topic of interests relating COVID-19 misinformation on social
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media. Thus, Chapter IV presented a novel method for a human-in-the-loop interactive
framework integrating natural language processing, machine learning, and distributed
representations of topics to analytically recommend keywords that are similarly and
accurately related to user’s topic of interest. In particular, the interactive framework
digests an inquiry in a form of text from a user and systematically produces a set of
keywords with the highest true positive rate with no greater than 0.2 false positive rate
threshold in model performance metrics for each misinformation class, see Figure 36,
Figure 37, Figure 38, and Figure 39. The system is designed for any texted based
datasets ideally and is applied to an early COVID-19 Twitter dataset as proof-of-concept
research. Figure 24 displays the human-in-the-loop interactive framework workflow for
this paper. An inquiry “COVID start lab” was a topic of interest of a user, in particular,
interest of the origin of COVID-19 specifically coming from a laboratory. Keep in mind
that the model was trained on a dataset containing Tweets during late March and midApril in the early outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, the origin of COVID19 started in a laboratory was considered a conspiracy during that timeframe. The
preliminary results show promising traits of the system. Out of the four types of
misinformation classes, unreliable, conspiracy, clickbait, and political/biased, both
unreliable (Figure 37) and conspiracy (Figure 36) classes performed better than the other
two based on the partial ROC curves. This also indicates the semantic meaning of the
user inquiry tends to have a similar conspiracy or unreliable misinformation rather than
being in the clickbait or political/biased category. As a final product of the system, two
sets of keywords were recommended for user’s information. The interactive framework
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recommended 21 words that are conspiracy related and most semantically similar to the
user inquiry (Figure 40) as well as 22 words recognized to be unreliable and most
semantically similar to the user inquiry (Figure 41). Both Figure 40 and Figure 41 further
display the probability of each word being classified as a conspiracy and unreliable,
respectively, along with each word count and word similarity score. Additionally,
performance metrics, true positive rate and false positive rate, for selecting these two sets
of keywords are displayed on the top left corner in Figure 40 and Figure 41 accordingly.
5.3 Significance of Research
In a joint statement by the DoD before the House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations, the DoD stated that disinformation
and misinformation is a critical threat to force protection and recognized that
disinformation and misinformation is one of today’s greatest challenges not just to the
DoD, but also to the U.S. [8]. In January 2020, the nine Combatant Commanders
memorandum which known as the “36-star memo” requested increasing intelligence
support for “messaging and countering disinformation operations as part of great power
competition.” The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
and the joint DoD-Director of National Intelligence responded with efforts to support
Operations in the Information Environment. The DoD continues to support follow-on
initiatives and lines of efforts with focus in Open-Source intelligence. In light of DoD’s
increasing demand on Open-Source intelligence in combating COVID-19 disinformation
and misinformation, this thesis work addressed COVID-19 related questions that may
contribute to any on-going efforts that have been put forth by the DoD.
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5.4 Recommendations for Future Research
For future studies, one may consider a context analysis on the recommended
keywords since there are about 40% of the words overlapped. It is also natural to
consider a cost analysis for selecting the distinct keywords instead of selecting the whole
recommended set. Lastly, one may also investigate the improvement on a fully
automated framework such that domain knowledge from a human is not required.
There are a few limitations and recommendations to this work. First, the
evaluation of the best top2vec model in Section 4.5.1 is based on human eye
interpretation of denseness and connectiveness of the coloring groups, i.e., topic groups.
A numerical evaluation of the visualization is an open research topic. Additionally in the
same section, due to resource constrain, three to at most five levels of settings were
considered when fine-tuning the top2vec model among the three hyperparameters.
Subsequently, Section 4.5.2 also use human interpretation of the semantic quality of the
keywords produced by top2vec. Combining the above limitation on evaluation of the
top2vec model performance using the Tweeter dataset, one may consider a five-fold cross
validation and grid search the most optimal model base on ROC curves performance
metric.
Next limitation is on the built-in method within top2vec. We encountered a
crucial issue when a user enters an out of vocabulary word in an inquiry, i.e., a word that
does not appear in the training dataset, top2vec semantic search function returns an error.
Even if a human enters a word that can be found in the training dataset, this same error
can still occur. The reason is that the default requirement for the minimum count of a
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word appearing in the training dataset is 50 times. If a word only appears 49 times, it still
won’t make the cut and is error bound. This minimum count of a word is a
hyperparameter in doc2vec algorithm which can be tuned according to operational
requirements. This work considered different values for the minimum count parameter
and found that higher value tends to work well.
As noted in previous work [14], the conspiracy misinformation class is
imbalanced for having 17% of the data being relabeled as conspiracy while the other
classes achieve at least 36% and some are as high as 64%. Due to the imbalanced nature
for the conspiracy class, the resulting keywords produced by the fine-tuned top2vec
model are all predicted to be not probable as conspiracy words. All 50 keywords from
the conspiracy misinformation class have lower than 0.5 probability being assigned as
conspiracy. Yet, the partial ROC for the conspiracy class outperformed all others. This
once again proved performance metrics such as ROC or partial ROC is more robust to
imbalanced data than is the conditional probability used in this work. But, there are other
remedies to address imbalanced data issue. One might consider up-sampling technique
which increases the samples in the underrepresented class or minority class. The
opposite of up-sampling is down-sampling which removes samples in the
overrepresented classes or the majority classes provided that the amount of samples in
these classes are abundant and remain sufficient in quantity after reduction. The second
solution, Chawla et al. proposed a Synthetic Minority Over-Sampling Technique which
combined method of oversampling the minority class and undersampling the majority
class [74]. The third solution could be through changing the loss function via weights.
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When multiplying the loss with the term in which a minority class occurs with a constant
value greater than 1, the classifier is forced or encouraged to pay more attention to the
minority class. The forth and also the last solution to resolve imbalanced data is another
reweight technique. Cui et al. proposed a reweighting scheme that use the effective
number of samples for each class to rebalance the loss which results in a class-balanced
loss [75].
The fourth challenge of this work is acquiring a gold standard dataset. This work
is based on the dataset curated and labeled by Sharma et al. yet the dataset labels were not
labeled by human, rather, via factchecking sources [13]. Therefore, each Tweet with one
or more misinformation label was solely dependent on the domain of the URLs shared in
the Tweet, and content of the Tweet was not considered in identifying misinformation
Tweets. Labeling a post on social media or news article based on domain of the news
source is prevalent in recent research works [76][77][78][79]. Micallef et al. recognized
that a very small percentage, 10%, of Tweets include external links and hence, developed
a novel COVID-19 related dataset including 4,800 Tweets annotated by human such that
each Tweet is labeled as one of the three categories: misinformation, countermisinformation, and irrelevant [80]. However, Micallef et al. dataset was only concerned
about COVID-19 misinformation on fake cures and 5G conspiracy theories. Clearly, a
gold standard dataset that examines the content of a post is lacking. Furthermore, the
standard for COVID-19 misinformation classification is a controversial topic since
recommendations and assessments may change over time due to new and updated
scientific evidence, according to the United States Surgeon General, Dr. Vivek Murthy
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[4]. Using the example in this work, the origin of COVID-19 in a laboratory was
considered a conspiracy in the beginning of the outbreak in 2020. However, in May of
2021, the U.S. president ordered intelligence community to investigate the origins of
COVID-19 including the theory of the virus potentially coming from a Chinese
laboratory [81]. What was once firmly held to be a pure conspiracy theory is now under
investigation with inconclusive official conclusions made public [82]. This makes the
subject to be exceedingly nebulous, and only serves to add to the level of uncertainty
within the general public. Conspiracy theories as such are challenging to categorize into
a binary of most likely true versus most likely untrue because of their shifting perception
among both the public and the public officials investigating them. This generates an
exponentially difficult scenario for scientific researchers to firmly and confidently
debunk these statements accurately as time can shift perception of them from most likely
untrue to controversial to possibly true as the investigation is ongoing. A solution to this
challenge in categorizing the data is to increase transparency in the information made
available to the research community and the general public as the president advocates for
a “full and transparent accounting” of the pandemic [82].
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